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ABSTRACT: Capital taxation is currently under debate, basically due to problems of administrative 
control and proper assessment of the levied assets. We analyze both problems focusing on a capital tax, 
the annual wealth tax (WT), which is only applied in five OECD countries, being Spain one of them. We 
concentrate our analysis on top 1% adult population, which permits us to describe the evolution of wealth 
concentration in Spain along 1983-2001. On average top 1% holds about 18% of total wealth, which rises 
to 19% when tax incompliance and under-assessment is corrected for housing, the main asset. The 
evolution suggests wealth concentration has risen. Regarding WT, we analyze whether it helps to reduce 
wealth inequality or, on the contrary, it reinforces vertical inequity (due to especial concessions) and 
horizontal inequity (due to the de iure and to de facto different treatment of assets). We analyze in detail 
housing and equity shares. By means of a time series analysis, we relate the reported values with 
reasonable price indicators and proxies of the propensity to save. We infer net tax compliance is 
extremely low, which includes both what we commonly understand by (gross) tax compliance and the 
degree of under-assessment due to fiscal legislation (for housing). That is especially true for housing, 
whose level of net tax compliance is well below 50%. Hence, we corroborate the difficulties in taxing 
capital, and so cast doubts on the current role of the WT in Spain in reducing wealth inequality. 
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RESUMEN: La imposición sobre el capital es un tema actual de debate, básicamente debido a los 
problemas de control administrativo y de la correcta valoración de los activos gravados. Ambos 
problemas son analizados centrándonos en el impuesto sobre el patrimonio (IP), el cual solo se aplica en 
cinco países de la OCDE, siendo España uno de ellos. Concentramos nuestro análisis en el 1% más rico 
de la población adulta, lo cual nos permite describir la evolución de la concentración de la riqueza en 
España a lo largo del período 1983-2001. En promedio, el 1% más rico posee alrededor del 18% de la 
riqueza total, aumentando hasta el 19% cuando se tiene en cuenta el incumplimiento fiscal y la 
infravaloración del principal activo sujeto a imposición, la vivienda. La evolución sugiere que la 
desigualdad ha aumentado. En relación al IP, analizamos también si éste ayuda a reducir la desigualdad 
de la riqueza o, por el contrario, refuerza la inequidad vertical (debido a tratamientos fiscales específicos) 
y la inequidad horizontal (debido al de iure y al de facto tratamiento diferente de los activos). El caso de 
la vivienda y de las acciones se analiza en detalle. Así, mediante un análisis econométrico de series 
temporales, relacionamos los valores declarados con indicadores razonables de los precios de los activos, 
así como de la propensión a ahorrar. Inferimos que el nivel neto de cumplimiento fiscal es 
extremadamente bajo, el cual incluye tanto lo que comúnmente conocemos como cumplimiento fiscal 
(bruto) y el nivel de infravaloración de los activos (sólo para vivienda). Este hecho es especialmente 
acusado para vivienda, cuyo nivel neto de cumplimiento fiscal está muy por debajo del 50%. Por 
consiguiente, corroboramos las dificultades de gravar el capital, generando serias dudas sobre el papel 
actual del IP en España respecto de la reducción de la desigualdad de la riqueza. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The future of capital taxation plays an important role in the public economic literature. 
Countries face increasing difficulties in taxing capital income and only a declining number of 
economists see a future for this source of income taxation (Auerbach, 2006; Becker and Fuest, 
2005). As a result most countries give a preferential treatment to capital income in the personal 
income tax (IT), particularly to the highest mobile capital, through special rebates, reduced rates 
or even full exemption. The Schanz-Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax, in principle 
majority in the OECD countries, seems in fact to have been abandoned. Important efficiency 
issues regarding its impact on savings or economic growth are raised in the debate. 
Administrative difficulties in taxing capital income also appear to be an important factor to 
justify preferential treatments. In this sense, to tax what you can tax in practice is becoming a 
more important principle than what in theory ought to be taxed (Lodin, 2000). Nonetheless, 
those more worried about equity concerns point out the possible negative impact on income 
distribution (vertical equity) and the discrimination it represents against other sources of 
income, especially wage income (horizontal equity). But the fact is capital income receives a 
preferential treatment compared to other sources of income4. 
 
The debate on capital taxation becomes even tougher when inheritance and gift tax (IGT) is 
considered probably because important value judgments are taken into account. Progressivity 
has long been a principal justification for that old capital tax (Gale and Slemrod, 2000)5. 
Inheritance and gift tax has been seen by some as a key mean of reducing inequalities and, 
therefore, of guarantying equality of opportunities. This justification appears more compelling 
because income concentration has been growing in many countries over the last 20 years 
(Slemrod and Bakija, 1999; Auerbach, 2006; Alvaredo and Saez, 2006). And as long as capital 
income is leniently taxed, inheritance taxation reinforces its progressivity role. Indeed, capital 
gains are taxed at lower rates in the IT and only when the underlying assets are sold. 
Furthermore, gains are not taxed at death, so only the IGT can assure they will finally not 
escape taxation (Gale and Slemrod, 2000)6. However, the very existence of IGT is also under 
debate both in the literature and in the public opinion. Italy and Portugal have quite recently 
                                                 
4 We concentrate on personal income tax, but in fact capital is also taxed in the corporate income tax. 
From the person perspective, the corporate tax could be deemed as a capital tax at source.  
 
5 In fact there are two types of transfer tax: on inheritances or on estates, but the arguments given may 
refer to both.  
 
6 In a study for the US, Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) estimate that in 1998 more than half of all estates 
whose value was above $10 million had over 50% of their wealth in the form of unrealized gains. 
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eliminated it7, and in the US there is currently a heated dispute about the future of estate tax and 
its possible abolition.8,9 Nevertheless, the fact is most countries still levy IGT. 
 
The literature and the tax systems have also considered another tax on capital, the annual net 
wealth tax. This is levied each year on the net value of wealth, besides income tax and 
inheritance tax, with the aim, among others, to reinforce the final redistributive effect of the 
whole tax system10. The wealth tax (WT) has usually been considered a complementary tax of 
income and inheritance taxes, although it could also be a substitutive for capital income taxes. 
Thus, as it taxes all wealth, it imposes a more uniform burden on the returns to saving compared 
to capital income taxes (Auerbach, 2006). However, this might encounter some difficulty as 
problems of assessment and/or of administrative control impede the desired uniformity in the 
tax treatment among assets (Smith, 2001). In fact, problems of assessment and of control along 
with efficiency issues have progressively taken most countries to repeal WT11. 
 
The aim of this paper is precisely analyzing whether those two problems are present in practice, 
and most important we will try to quantify them. We will do it for the Spanish WT, one of the 
few OECD countries that still applies this tax. In order to analyze the importance of assessment 
and control issues, we will focus on reported wealth by top 1% of adult population. Thus, and 
not least relevant, from this (fiscal) data we will also be able to analyze the evolution of wealth 
concentration in Spain following the flourishing literature in this field carried out for other 
countries (see, e.g., Atkinson and Piketty, forthcoming)12. 
                                                 
7 In the eighties, Australia and Canada removed the IGT, although in both cases the elimination was the 
final result of a “race to the bottom” competitive process among regions. See Bird (1991) and Cooper 
(2006).  
 
8 Despite generating only about 1.5% of federal revenues and hitting only fewer than 2% of decedents the 
dispute is quite passionate. See, among others, Auerbach (2006); Kopczuk (2006); Kopczuk and Lupton 
(2005); Kopczuk and Slemrod (2000, 2003, 2005); Gale and Slemrod (2000, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
9 In the US current law foresees a gradual reduction of the tax which would finally be repealed only for 
2010, and then reinstated it in its pre-reform structure at the following year. 
 
10 According to the Meade Report (1978), the possible introduction of an expenditure tax would reinforce 
the redistributive role of the WT, and therefore would provide a stronger argument for its inclusion in the 
tax system. 
 
11 When a general tax reform process started in the eighties, only half of the OECD countries levied the 
tax. Nonetheless, the situation is quite different nowadays and as a steady process of eliminating the WT 
seems to have started since the nineties. In 2007 only one out of six OECD countries does apply it, which 
means only five countries. In the last ten years approximately, seven countries repealed the tax. 
 
12 In fact, the results derived from this analysis for Spain are not fully new, as Alvaredo and Saez (2006) 
have recently done a similar exercise. However, we will argue that given the nature of the fiscal data for 
the Spanish case a different technique of interpolation – necessary in all these studies to “transform” the 
fiscal data tabulated by wealth brackets into percentiles – might be more appropriate, and in any case we 
will comment some legal issues not explicitly taken into account by them (e.g., the change of tax unit 
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In order to obtain the reported wealth of top 1%, we follow an interpolation methodology 
proposed by Atkinson (2004). We show top 1% holds on average almost 18% of total wealth for 
the 1988-2001 period. The evolution, albeit not linear, illustrates a slight increase in wealth 
inequality. The studies that estimate wealth (or income) concentration from fiscal data, 
however, do not take into account the level of tax compliance, which might be especially 
relevant for top rich taxpayers. From our empirical estimates obtained in quantifying the 
importance of tax compliance and under-assessment, we are able to correct the reported values 
for the main asset under taxation, housing13. Once we do that, the conclusions regarding the 
evolution of wealth concentration do not change much (i.e., tax compliance and the degree of 
under-assessment do not vary much along time), but the concentration levels rise on average up 
to 19%. If the aim is reducing inequality, the question to be answered is whether the (current) 
WT is a right mean to achieve a less unequal wealth concentration14. 
 
To respond the question, we have carried out an empirical analysis for the two main assets taxed 
in the WT, real estate property and equity shares, for the period 1983-200115. Our empirical 
methodology is very simple. In a multivariate regression analysis, we relate the reported values 
by top 1% - calculated from interpolation – with representative price index and control variables 
that attempt to account for the propensity to accumulate each kind of asset. From the results of 
the econometric exercise, we are able to estimate the level of tax compliance, and as far as real 
estate property is concerned, also of the degree of under-assessment. Although the results in 
both cases (must) lie within a range, we obtain very low levels of tax compliance, which are 
especially low for the case of housing. Therefore, the current WT does not seem an appropriate 
mean to reduce inequality (given the high level of tax incompliance in both assets), while at the 
same it seems to distort between assets (given, for example, the even higher level of tax 
                                                                                                                                               
since 1988) or will try to correct the reported values by the level of tax incompliance and the degree of 
under-assessment of the main asset under taxation, real estate property. In this sense, our results can be 
considered as complementary to theirs, who additionally also focus on the evolution of income 
concentration. 
 
13 Our estimates would also permit to correct the level of tax compliance for equity shares traded in 
organized markets, but the effect on the wealth concentration would be very small. 
 
14 In Spain, as we will explain in section 3, an IGT decentralized to the regions (AC’s) is also present. 
However, a “race-to-the-bottom” seems to have started among AC’s. If this process regarding the IGT 
goes on, and wealth inequality is still increasing, the WT would be the only tax instrument that could 
contribute to reducing wealth inequality. However, that potential role of the WT is in doubt given the 
presumably low levels of tax compliance and the under-assessment of the main assets under taxation, 
among other legal factors that will be discussed in section 3. 
 
15 In fact, we could have added year 1982 and year 2002. However, in the former case, the data is not 
reliable at all, while regarding 2002, it has not been possible to consider the owner-occupied-dwelling 
exemption. Therefore, our analysis of wealth concentration has to restrict to 1983-2001 period, while the 
analysis of the performance of WT in taxing real tax capacity regarding equity shares and real estate 
property spans for 1983-2002 and 1983-2001, respectively.  
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incompliance in housing). The conclusions obtained from this analysis are not new, especially 
regarding to the under-assessment of real estate property, but the novelty is that we have 
achieved to quantify them. Among other issues, our empirical framework also permits us to 
quantify a “tax on tax revenue”16 present by 1988, the monetary impact of the owner-occupied-
dwelling exemption established in 2000, or simulate alternative tax policies aimed at increasing 
the level of tax compliance in the case of real estate property. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly explain the recent 
evolution of WT in the OECD countries and the key elements of the tax where applied. Section 
3 describes the case under study (the Spanish WT) since its introduction in 1977 paying especial 
attention to its most important legal aspects. The interpolation process and how evolves the 
concentration of wealth is in section 4. Section 5 develops the empirical framework and presents 
the results of the empirical analysis. The paper ends with a section of conclusions. 
 
2. The Annual Net Wealth Tax in OECD Countries  
 
Countries have traditionally levied capital through personal and corporate income taxes, 
inheritance and gift tax and immovable property tax, but only a few have had an annual net 
wealth tax. In the mid eighties, half of the twenty-four OECD countries possessed a WT, while 
the other half did not. Nonetheless, in 2007 only five of the thirty OECD countries possess the 
tax (Table 1) 17, 18. This noteworthy change is due to a process started in the mid nineties of 
removal of the WT. Following, we analyze the reasons for the introduction and elimination of 
WT and what the features of the tax are in those countries that still levy it, or have done it until 
recently. 
 
 
                                                 
16 By a “tax on tax revenue”, we refer to that situation in which the government responsible for the 
administration of a certain tax only keeps a fraction of each monetary unit collected. The rest of the 
fraction is transferred (either directly or via the central government) to other governments of the same 
level as a means of equalizing fiscal capacity. That is, this situation generates a substitution effect in favor 
of diminishing the efforts in collecting taxes. Baretti et al. (2002) were the authors that first named this 
effect in this way. In Spain, until 1988 the fraction to be transferred for equalization purposes via the 
central government was 100%.  
 
17 Before 2006 Luxembourg levied WT on both individuals and corporations. Since 2006 the tax is 
abolished on individuals but it continues to apply to corporations. Nowadays, only Switzerland taxes 
corporations. Therefore, in this paper we only consider WT on individuals, which seems more reasonable 
for an international analysis. Probably, the peculiarities of the tax system in Luxembourg and in 
Switzerland may explain why they also taxed corporations.  
 
18 In Sweden, the government has announced WT will be phased out during the current electoral period 
and as a first step the tax rate has been halved from to 1.5 to 0.75% on business capital from 2007. 
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Table 1. WT in the OECD countries 
1985 2007 
♦ Austria 
♦ Denmark 
♦ Finland 
♦ France 
♦ Germany 
♦ Iceland 
♦ Luxembourg 
♦ Netherlands 
♦ Norway 
♦ Spain 
♦ Sweden 
♦ Switzerland 
♦ France 
♦ Norway 
♦ Spain 
♦ Sweden 
♦ Switzerland 
Source: OECD (1988) and International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (constantly updated 
database); year of elimination: Austria (1994); Denmark and Germany (1997); Netherlands 
(2001); Iceland (2005); and Finland and Luxembourg (2006). 
 
The WT was first levied by some Nordic and Central European countries according to a tax 
system historically more based on direct taxation. The tax had usually been introduced at the 
early stages of the twentieth century, although in the Swiss cantons and in the Netherlands the 
origin comes from the XIXth (OECD, 1988). Later on, Spain and France introduced a WT in 
1977 and in 1982, respectively, although the latter country eliminated it for a short period 
(1986-1987). In the meantime, Japan introduced a WT for a brief period (1950-1952) as well as 
Ireland (1975 to 1977). In conclusion, apart from few changes, the WT had remained for a very 
long period in some tax systems, while other countries had never considered suitable to adopt it.  
 
What are the reasons to adopt a WT? The answer is not easy, since several factors usually play a 
role, not necessarily the same in all countries. Besides, the reasons may differ over time. 
However, based on the previous literature, an OECD report on taxation on net wealth (OECD, 
1988) suggests some reasons: the administrative convenience of taxing something which is 
visible, particularly for the earliest WT when the bulk of wealth consisted of immovable 
property; the taxation of the additional ability which wealth confers on its possessor, so that 
reinforces horizontal equity; and the reduction of inequality, especially in those countries where 
the tax was later introduced. In conclusion, half of the OECD countries found enough reasons to 
justify a WT. 
 
Nevertheless, the situation changes since the mid nineties, when an increasing number of 
countries started to eliminate the tax. Consequently, we wonder what the reasons are behind the 
recent elimination of the tax. However, again, it is not easy to give a single reason to the 
question, since several factors play a part, and frequently they are related to own political issues 
of each country. Nonetheless, we find one main reason: the difficulty of taxing capital. “The tax 
base associated with capital income and high-wealth individuals is becoming increasingly 
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geographically mobile” (Owens, 2006, p. 161). Taking away WT often seeks to give a better 
treatment of capital so that makes tax systems more competitive. Therefore, if in the past a 
reason to justify the tax was the administrative convenience of taxing something visible, today 
the situation goes in the other way around. An important part of wealth consists of high movable 
property, not visible at all and therefore difficult to tax in a personal WT. The analysis of some 
countries’ reforms demonstrates this situation. 
 
In Austria the elimination of WT must be seen in a broader context, the reform of capital 
income taxation started in 1993. The reform introduced a final withholding tax on some capital 
revenues, with the aim to improve the taxation of economic activities and so the international 
competitiveness within the single European market (Genser, 1996). The suppression of a 
specific wealth tax in the Netherlands also took place in a broader reform of the IT, which after 
36 years of applying the same tax was changed in 2001. The new Dutch IT offers a more 
favorable treatment of capital income, which is levied by a reduced proportional rate, 30%, 
considerably smaller than the rates on labor income19,20. In Iceland the removal of the WT in 
2005 is one of the measures of a wider tax reform to improve competitiveness of the tax system 
and stimulate the economy. In Finland the final abolition of WT comes just after several 
changes introduced in 2005 to improve the better treatment of investment income (both in the 
personal and corporate income taxes) and to reduce WT (a threshold increase from 185,000 € to 
250,000 € and tax rate fall from 0.9% to 0.8%). In Luxembourg, the main objective of the bill 
that eliminates WT is to make the tax regime which applies to Luxembourg residents more 
attractive, and for that reason also introduces a withholding tax in full discharge of tax on 
savings income in the form of interest payments21. In conclusion, an important aim to eliminate 
WT is to “improve” capital taxation, that is, to reduce it. 
 
Nonetheless, the above mentioned OECD report also points out two other reasons for the 
introduction of the tax: the additional ability to pay that wealth confers and the reduction of 
inequality. But the international experiences suggest WT also fails to achieve both objectives, 
quite frequently as a consequence of inherent problems of the tax caused by assessment 
                                                 
19 Income is divided in three independent boxes. Box 1 consists mainly of labor income items, although 
also some kind of capital income, such as imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings, and it is taxed at 
progressive rates up to 52%. 
 
20 As the 30% rate on capital income levies a presumptive return of 4% on the value of taxable assets, the 
new IT equals an implicit WT with a nominal tax rate of 1.2% (Meussen, 2000). However, expressed as a 
percentage of the actual return, the tax liability differs between assets, depending on the actual return 
(Cnossen and Bovenberg, 2001). 
 
21 The Act from 23 December 2005 introduces a withholding tax of 10% on interest income of residents 
in excess of € 250 per year. 
7
difficulties and special concessions. 
 
For instance, in Germany, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the WT in 1995, 
because the law gave an unequal treatment to different types of wealth22. Some assets and rights 
were valued according to their market value, while others where assessed according to other 
values well far away from the market price. The used valuation of real property dated from 
1964, because since that year revaluations, scheduled to occur every six years, had not been 
carried out. The Court declared the tax unconstitutional and gave to the legislative power a 
period to reform the tax. But, in addition, the court introduced two limitations (Wendt, 1997). 
On the one hand, the tax may not lead to a taxation of the substance, that is, it may not cause a 
reduction of the property itself. On the other hand, property that serves the personal needs and 
sustenance of the taxpayer and his family had to be exempted. In 1997, once concluded the 
period given by the Constitutional Court, as the Parliament had not approved a new law, the WT 
became inapplicable, disappearing from the German tax system23.  
 
In Iceland, two years before eliminating the WT, the government reduced the tax rate from 1.2% 
to 0.6% on both individuals and companies and increased the tax-free threshold by 20% to 
counter the effects of the recent general review of real property values, with the aim the revision 
should not lead to an increase in net wealth taxation. At the same time it decided to do away 
with the net wealth surtax on net wealth exceeding a certain amount. On the other hand, the 
Icelander tax was considered to be discriminatory between different assets (Herd and 
Thorgeirsson, 2001). Bank deposits were exempt to the extent that they did not exceed the 
indebtedness of an individual. Equities were taxed, but when hold by individuals, only up to the 
par value of the shares. Companies were liable to pay the tax when the book value of their 
equity exceeds the par value of their shares, and no wealth tax was paid on the market value of 
the company exceeding its net worth.  
 
In Finland, the tax generated incentives for taxpayers to inflate their liabilities and to invest in 
low-taxed assets, particularly housing (Joumard and Suyker, 2002). Some quoted shares were 
valued at 70% of the market price. Furthermore, bank accounts and bonds, subject to the tax 
withheld at source from interest, were exempt from WT. Therefore, neither all assets were liable 
to the tax nor all were equally assessed. Norway, that still levies the tax, under-assesses houses 
(around 25% of the market price) and shares (at 80% of the company’s net tax value), and 
                                                 
22 Decision from 22nd June 1995, 93/121. 
 
23 In 2002, ten Länder made a proposal for a new WT, but they failed in their purpose. 
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financial assets accumulated in occupational pension funds escape the tax24. As a result, it 
jeopardizes horizontal equity and provokes a paradox that internationally immobile capital is 
more lenient taxed than mobile capital (Van den Noord, 2000). And a similar situation takes 
place in Spain, as we will comment in the next section and will show in the empirical section. 
 
To know more in deep the features of WT, Table 2 shows the key parameters for the seven 
OECD countries levied it in 2005. Only Luxembourg and Switzerland tax both individuals and 
companies, while the others only tax individuals. All countries grant a general allowance, 
although the amount can vary considerably among countries. France has the greatest threshold, 
in line with the purpose of only taxing big fortunes, as the same name of the tax indicates (impôt 
sur les grandes fortunes). One the other hand, Finland, Luxemburg and Sweden have a flat tax, 
while the others apply a progressive schedule tax, particularly significant in France and Spain. 
Top marginal rates offer big differences among countries, being particularly great in Spain, 
where it is five times bigger than in Luxembourg or three times bigger than in Finland25. In 
Switzerland the tax is levied by cantons and municipalities, but not by the federal government26. 
Cantons and municipalities regulate inter alia deductions and tax rates; thereby WT has 
important differences within the country. In Spain, as we will see in the next section, regions 
(AC’s) can also regulate deductions and tax rates, although for the time being differences are 
not significant. 
 
The yield of the tax over total taxation is very low in all countries, but Luxembourg and 
Switzerland, and it has remained low for the last decades. The great bulk of revenues in 
Luxembourg come from taxing industrial, commercial and financing corporations, while a small 
part comes from individuals because the assessment of estates is very advantageous for 
taxpayers27. However, the opposite happens in Switzerland, where yield from companies only 
account for one fourth of the WT revenues. 
 
We can also observe countries offer especial concessions for certain assets, being especially 
important those related to business assets and dwellings28. For example, business assets held by 
                                                 
24 For 2007, the Norwegian government has proposed a 10% increase in the assessed values of real estate 
properties recognizing the price growth on housing amplifies the distortions characterizing the WT. 
 
25 Precisely the two countries with the smallest top rates, Luxembourg and Finland, do not already levy 
the tax. 
 
26 Since 1959 the federal government does not levy WT. 
27 Projet de Loi concernant le budget des recettes et des depenses de l’Etat, 2006. 
 
28 Other assets, such as human capital or pension rights, have never been taxed due to inevitable 
administrative difficulties. See Sandford (1992). 
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individuals can be exempt in France, Spain or Sweden, or enjoy a 70% deduction in Finland. 
Owner-occupied dwellings enjoy a 10,000 € deduction in Finland, a 20% rebate in France or are 
exempt in Spain, up to a maximum value of 150,253 €.  
 
Table 2. The WT in the OECD countries 
 Finland* France Luxembourg* Norway
1 Spain3 Sweden 
Switzerland
5 
Year 2005 2006 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 
Taxpayer Individuals Individuals 
Individuals 
and companies 
Individuals Individuals Individuals 
Individuals 
and 
companies 
Threshold ($) 200,965 597,134 
2,010 + 2,010 
per child 
20,0802 86,131 129,1114 
it varies per 
cantons 
Minimum 
marginal rate 
0.8% 0.55% 0.5% 0.9% 0.2% 1.5% 
it varies per 
cantons 
Top marginal 
rate 
0.8% 1.8% 0.5% 1.1% 2.5% 1.5% 
it varies per 
cantons 
Number of 
brackets  
1 6 1 2 8 1 -     
% WT over 
total taxation 
(2004) 
0,2% 0,4% 
5.3% 
1.2% ind. 
4.1% cor. 
1.3% 0,4% 0,4% 
4.7% 
3.5% ind. 
1.2% cor. 
* Finland and Luxembourg repealed WT in 2005, but we still include them to analyze the key parameters of recent 
WT. 
(1) WT is levied by the national government and the municipalities. Tax rates include both national and municipal 
WT.  
(2) 2006 exchange rate: 1 $ = 6.407 NOK. 
(3) AC’s can modify threshold and tax rates. The information given refers to the basic state regulation, since few 
changes have been introduced. 
(4) 2006 exchange rate: 1 $ = 7.368 SEK 
(5) WT is levied by cantons and municipalities, but not the federal government. Those can set threshold and tax rates, 
with important disparities among them. 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, OECD Revenue Statistics and own calculations.  
 
 
In conclusion, given the practical difficulties in taxing capital, very few countries levy a WT. 
Furthermore, the experience shows different assets are unequally treated, either because there 
are explicit special treatments or because the disparity of assessment criteria. Hence, it seems 
quite complicated countries can achieve any of the reasons given to justify WT. As Van den 
Noord and Heady (2001, p. 35) affirm, “countries using this tax could usefully reassess the 
merits of continuing to apply”. We will precisely try to study that for the Spanish case, whose 
peculiarities we explain next. 
 
3. The Annual Net Wealth Tax in Spain  
 
Spain introduced a WT in 1977, within a package for an overall tax reform that was carried out 
with the arrival of democracy29. It was first set out as an extraordinary and transitory tax, but 
                                                 
29 Act 50/1977, 14 November. 
10
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
after fifteen years both supposed features were officially taken away30 and nowadays the WT 
still remains in the Spanish tax system.  
 
The governmental reasons to justify the tax were that (i) it complements the personal income tax 
(IT), since it levies an additional ability to pay and relies more on the richest taxpayers; (ii) it 
promotes a more productivity use of capital; (iii) it helps to control IT due to the provided 
information; and (iv) it has a positive redistributive effect. In 1991, when the Parliament 
approved a new law reforming the tax, it made reference to all these ends, but emphasizing the 
more productivity use of richness and the achievement of a better redistribution31 additional to 
the IT one. Nonetheless, the assessment criteria of assets and rights fixed at the law and 
subsequent legal modifications have made very difficult to achieve any of those aims.  
 
Graph 1. Under-assessment of Real Estate Property 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The series is calculated as the ration between average cadastral 
value and average market price.  
Source: Ministry of Public Works and Cadastral Office, several 
years. See more details in section 5.2. 
 
The sole criterion of assessment that would assure to tax the real ability to pay that wealth 
confers is market price (MP). Further, it would permit an homogeneous treatment of all wealth 
components. To know MP is easy and direct regarding, for example, equity shares traded in 
organized markets or bank accounts. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult for many other assets. For 
instance, to assess the value of real estates taxpayers have to choose the greatest of the three 
following values: cadastral value (CV), price of acquisition, or declared value in other taxes 
                                                 
30 Act 19/1991, 6 June. 
 
31 For that reason the maximum marginal rate was increased. 
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checked by the tax administration32. However, in practice, unless there has been a recent 
transmission, taxpayers report the CV, which is far below MP. As Graph 1 shows for the 1987-
2001 period, average CV only stands for between 20% and 30% of the average MP. As real 
estate represents about 70% of average net wealth of households throughout the period 
(according to National Accounts), the most important component of wealth is clearly under-
assessed. Likewise, shares not traded in the stock market are basically assessed according to 
company‘s accountancy, therefore, taking into account historical values rather than market 
ones33. And the same happens with assets assigned to individual businesses and professional 
persons. In conclusion, most of the reported wealth is not assessed according to MP and the 
differences between MP and the fiscal criteria can be very important. 
 
On the other hand, the 1991 WT levied all net wealth, with a few minor exemptions (among 
others, household furnishings or artists’ own works). But in 1994 the government introduced the 
exemption for business assets, with the aim of favoring entrepreneur investment34. The 
exemption is both for property and rights assigned to individual businesses and professional 
persons and for holdings in companies whenever certain conditions are fulfilled35. This 
exemption, however, trades off with the above mentioned main objective of the Spanish WT, 
redistribution, as it is concentrated particularly on richest taxpayers.  
 
In 1993, the last year before the exemption, official statistics show that about top 1% of 
taxpayers held 7% of all assets assigned to businesses and almost 40% of all non-traded equity 
shares. Furthermore, the exemption has become an easy tax shelter, particularly for highest 
wealth taxpayers, which can re-organize their wealth and enjoy the exemption quite easily. 
When that was first introduced in 1994, only 21% of the total individual business assets were 
exempt. Since then, this percentage has steadily increased and is currently over 70%. Business 
                                                 
32 The cadastral value is assessed for the property tax. The declared value in other taxes checked by the 
tax administration only happens when there is a transmission either mortis causa or inter vivos. Therefore, 
this last value can be considered as a checked acquisition price, which in fact means the MP when the 
estate is acquired. 
 
33 In fact, the law also foresees three possible values to take the greatest one: denomination of shares, net 
asset value per share or assessed value obtained from capitalize at 20% the average benefits from the 
three previous years. 
34 Act 22/1993, 29 December, later developed by Royal Decree 2481/1994, 23 December. 
 
35 The exemption for business activities applies to property and rights assigned to individual businesses 
and professional persons whenever the taxpayer carries out directly the activity and obtains from that 
most of his taxable income. The exemption for holdings in companies, whether or not listed on organized 
markets, applies whenever the taxable person owns at least 15% (5% since 2003) of the company himself 
or 20% along with his family; the companies concerned are not operating under the tax transparency 
rules, in other words, they really carry out an economic activity; the taxpayer plays an active part in the 
management of the company; and, finally he obtains most of his taxable income from the company. 
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exemption accounted for 4% of tax base in 1994. In 2003 this percentage rose to 32%36. Top 
10% of taxpayers accumulated 64% of all business exemptions in 200337. If redistribution is an 
important goal of the WT, the exemption of business assets undermines this end, and also goes 
against horizontal equity. In addition, tax saving from the business related exemptions has been 
reinforced since June 1996, with the introduction of a new 95% deduction for business 
transmission among close relatives in the IGT38, subject to the exemption of business assets in 
the WT39. Therefore, the business exemption has provoked a re-organization of business assets 
to fulfill with the legal conditions.  
 
The evolution of the reported business assets that are exempt is shown in Graph 2. The gap 
between the tax base (the wealth finally taxed) and the modified base (that including reported 
business exempt) for top 1% of adult population boosts since 1994. It appears quite clear that 
tax planning has become very common in the Spanish WT for the top percentile.  
 
A few years after the business exemption, in 2000, the government introduced another one: the 
exemption of owner-occupied dwellings40. This new exemption has had an important effect on 
the total number of WT taxpayers, with an almost 15% fall, and on the tax yield, that went down 
8%. In Spain, where official statistics show more than 80% of people live in owner dwellings, 
which in addition as we said before are under-assessed, the new exemption sets many former 
taxpayers below the threshold, hence, out of the tax. Furthermore, it introduces more inequality 
between assets and more distortions in the allocation of savings.  
                                                 
36 This information is based on reported data, because taxpayers still have to declare exempt business 
assets. However, there is often a common belief that some taxpayers do not declare them, since they do 
not pay anything, and therefore they do not bother WT. Or alternatively, they declare the exempt assets or 
shares but assessed according to false values, very small compared to the real ones, since regardless the 
declared value they pay nothing. Although it is difficult to demonstrate this suspicious, for instance, the 
comparison between the evolution of the number of taxpayers reporting business income in the IT and the 
number of taxpayers reporting business assets in the WT shows an opposite trend. Thus, from 1994 to 
2004, the number of IT taxpayers reporting business income has increased 11%, while the number of WT 
taxpayers reporting business assets has gone down 35%. Consequently, the weight of business related 
exemptions over tax base would probably be much greater at the present moment. 
 
37 In official statistics, taxpayers are always aggregated according to tax base, which do not include 
exemptions. Therefore, it is difficult to know the real distribution of business exemptions along “real” 
wealth (that is, before exemptions). Tax base is the sole proxy we can employ. 
38 The Spanish Inheritance Tax is highly progressive with nominal marginal tax rates up to 34%, but they 
can be higher since a multiplicative coefficient that varies 1 and 2.4 is applied depending on the level of 
wealth held by the heir before the transmission and the relationship with the deceased. Therefore, despite 
in only very few cases, marginal rate can reach 81.6%. 
 
39 Royal Decree-Law 7/1996, 7 June. 
 
40 The official justification was to conclude the improvement in the taxation of owner-occupied dwellings, 
started in the 1999 IT reform, when the taxation of the imputed rent was removed (Act 6/2000, 13 
December). 
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Graph 2. The Evolution of Business Exemption for Top 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Expressed in 2002 euros. M3odified base is tax base plus business related 
exemptions. Top 1% of adult population according to refined-lower bound (See 
section 4). Real estate assessed on fiscal criterion.  
 
 
A final issue to point out is the role of WT as far as tax administration is concerned, particularly 
regarding the control of IT. When WT was introduced, the tax was administered by the central 
government, also engaged in the administration of IT and other taxes. However, the 
development of a financing system for the then just created AC’s provoked that the yield was 
later given to them, along with the power to administer and collect the tax.  This has been 
criticized by undermining the function of the tax as a means of control (De Pablos, 2006; 
Esteller, 2004; Pedrós, 1981), given the difficulties of collaboration among national tax 
administration and regional tax administrations41.  
 
To sum up, from this descriptive analysis it does not seem Spanish WT fulfils any of the aims 
that justified its introduction. Both central and regional governments do not currently pay much 
attention to the tax and even lobbies do not care, since they already obtained what they wished. 
In section 5, we will study empirically the Spanish WT, analyzing how exemptions, assessment 
                                                 
41 Since 1997 AC’s also have some legislative power, extended in 2002, thereby they can regulate without 
any limitation important tax parameters: threshold, tax rates and tax credits. Nonetheless, they cannot 
modify other issues, as the assessment rules or the exemptions. For the time being, Spanish AC’s have 
been quite passive and they have only introduced few and minor changes, with the only exception is 
Cantabria, a northern region, that in 2006 increased considerably the threshold, from 108,182.18 € to 
150,000 €, and the top marginal rate from 2.5% to 3%. Nonetheless, AC’s have been very active in other 
taxes on wealth, such as IGT, where a clear competitive race among Spanish AC’s seems to have started, 
similar to what happened in the eighties in Australia and Canada (Durán and Esteller, 2006). 
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criteria and under-compliance appear to undermine the WT goals. With that aim, we calculate 
declared values by top 1%, which requires carrying out an interpolation from the tax statistics. 
This will also permit us to describe the evolution of wealth concentration in Spain. 
 
4. Wealth Concentration from Fiscal Data 
 
In this section we first explain the interpolation methodology. Next we analyse in detail the 
evolution of wealth concentration from WT data. 
 
4.1 Methodological issues  
 
We focus our analysis on top 1% of richest adult population. There is a widespread assumption 
rich taxpayers are more responsive to tax changes, both because their marginal rates are higher 
and because they have more opportunities for altering their behavior (see, e.g., Moffitt and 
Wilhelm, 2000). Furthermore, since its adoption the Spanish WT has only levied a small 
percentage of adult population, between 2% and 4%, as the threshold, following the 
progressivity aim, seeks to concentrate on wealthiest individuals. Likewise, by considering all 
population instead of taxpayers, our target group remains more stable and the number of 
members is less sensitive to legal modifications, such as new exemptions or thresholds42.  
 
In absence of micro-data, we have had to work with aggregate data. As usual for this kind of 
information, in the statistics taxpayers are gathered into several brackets according to their level 
of tax base, regardless of the number of people within each interval. Therefore, it is necessary to 
interpolate to know the wealth for specific percentiles (top 10%, top 1%, etcetera). The most 
common method employed in the literature, and also by Alvaredo and Saez (2006) in a recent 
work for Spain, is “Pareto interpolation” (from now on, PI)43, which is based on the assumption 
that the distribution of wealth at the top is Pareto in form. However, Atkinson (2004) argues that 
“the potential error in making such interpolation depends on the width of the ranges” (p. 13). 
This is an especially important issue for the Spanish case because the number and width of 
intervals in the data are not the same along the studied period (1983-2001), and changes are 
quite important. Hence, we use an alternative methodology proposed by the very Atkinson 
(2004), which does not depend on the assumption of the distribution is Pareto in form, but on 
                                                 
42 For instance, the total number of taxpayers over the year before fell about 15% in 1988, in 1992 and in 
2000 due to different legal modifications (individual tax unit, new act and housing exemption, 
respectively).  
 
43 Among many others, see Feenberg and Poterba (1993 & 2000) and Piketty (2001 & 2003). Atkinson 
(2004) explains this follows a tradition since a Pareto interpolation was already used in a 1906 report of 
the House of Commons Committee on Income Tax. 
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assuming a non-increasing density for the upper brackets (Gastwirth, 1972). This methodology 
is illustrated in Graph 3. 
 
Graph 3. Methodology of interpolation: Lower and Upper Bounds 
 
 
 
 
 
On the one hand, the gross lower bound (G-LB) supposes that within that range (i.e., Wi+1-Wi) 
all the mass of population is concentrated at the average of the range (Waverage). Hence, this 
bound implies maximum equality regarding the distribution of wealth within that interval (see 
Cowell, 2000). On the other hand, the gross upper bound (G-UB) implies maximum inequality 
within the interval, and it is calculated assuming that within that range a certain percentage of 
taxpayers is concentrated at the minimum amount of wealth of the interval (Wi) while the rest is 
concentrated at the maximum (Wi+1)
44. In Table 3, we can see that differences between the G-
LB and the G-UB for top 1% are not very important. The greatest differences are concentrated 
in the 1988-98 period (up to 10.5% and 5.9% on average), when the tax statistics only offer 10 
intervals. Hence, during that period, the results of the interpolation are less precise. For that 
reason, when possible we also calculate a refined lower bound (R-LB) and a refined upper 
bound (R-UB). 
 
                                                 
44 The percentage of taxpayers in each extreme of the interval has to be calculated in order to guarantee 
that the resulting average coincides with the real one. For example, the percentage of taxpayers 
concentrated at the minimum value of the interval (yi) is (Wi+1−Waverage)/ (Wi+1−Wi). The percentage of 
taxpayers at the other extreme is simply 1-[(Wi+1−Waverage)/ (Wi+1−Wi)]. 
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Table 3. Top 1% Average Wealth: Gross and Refined Lower and Upper Bounds  
 G-LB R-LB G-UB R-UB 
1983 572,823 572,823 574,708 574,708 
1984 543,704 543,704 547,598 547,598 
1985 553,905 553,905 556,896 556,896 
1986 599,036 599,036 606,168 606,168 
1987 636,798 636,798 639,262 639,262 
1988 646,323 651,095 651,414 651,414 
1989 661,426 679,136 685,565 684,884 
1990 650,298 674,525 692,165 690,169 
1991 651,544 678,203 709,156 698,508 
1992 623,067 649,573 687,874 670,580 
1993 655,427 680,857 724,403 701,726 
1994 642,367 668,798 702,362 684,983 
1995 650,469 674,790 698,667 687,528 
1996 700,582 720,801 734,537 729,045 
1997 785,473 797,577 801,910 800,628 
1998 863,876 868,562 869,260 869,118 
1999 938,538 938,538 942,932 942,932 
2000 982,447 982,447 980,742 980,742 
2001 1,013,951 1,013,951 1,014,011 1,014,011 
Note: Expressed in 2002 Euros. The data is obtained from fiscal data. Includes 
reported wealth (and so it is estimated according to the fiscal criteria of assessment) 
and from 1994 onwards business assets reported but exempt. In 2000 and 2001 also 
includes the assessed value of owner-occupied housing exemption using our 
empirical estimates as no fiscal data are available regarding this exemption (see 
section 5.3.1; the value of the estimated exemption depends on the use of the MP as 
assessment criterion, here we have supposed the percentage use is equal to 10%).  
 
 
The calculus of the refined bounds is based on Atkinson (2004), who supposes non-increasing 
density at the top of the whole distribution of taxpayers (Gastwirth, 1972). The procedure to 
obtain these refined bounds is also shown on Graph 3. In order to obtain the lower bound, 
instead of assuming that the whole mass of taxpayers are concentrated right at the mean, 
Atkinson assumes that they tend to concentrate around it. In particular, they concentrate within a 
range located a certain distance left to the average (until Wi) and the same distance to the right 
(until Q). Around those values (Wi − Q), density is linearly decreasing, and from Q onwards the 
density is zero. Similar to the calculus of the G-UB, in order to obtain the corresponding 
refined, Atkinson assumes that taxpayers concentrate at Wi and at Wi+1. Thus, in contrast to the 
lower bound, there must be taxpayers in both extremes. Then, given the restriction of 
maintaining the average of wealth at its real values, which is also binding for the calculus of the 
R-LB, we obtain point P. This means that the percentage of taxpayers at the bottom of the 
interval is given by (Hi − P). From then on, the density is decreasing till point W1+1. This 
(refined) methodology certainly offers a more precise interpolation, as shown in Table 3, and 
now the greatest differences are up to about 3% and 1.67% on average. 
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By applying this alternative methodology of interpolation our results can be compared with 
those obtained by Alvaredo and Saez (2006) using the PI45. Graph 4 shows the evolution of the 
reported average wealth for top 1% according to the different methods of interpolation46. In 
spite of being difference in absolute terms, we can observe all assessed values evolve in a quite 
similar way. Both refined bounds are always very similar and they give a higher amount of 
wealth compared to PI. The highest differences take place when the number of brackets is 
smallest (10 brackets), which seems to confirm Atkinson’s words that the potential error in 
interpolation depends on the width of the ranges 47. From now, in order to perform an analysis of 
the evolution of wealth concentration, we will use the interpolated values using Atkinson’s 
proposed methodology. The differences between R-LB and R-UB values are on average about 
one percent, therefore fairly small. For that reason, in order to avoid an excess of data we 
mainly concentrate on R-LB values, which are slightly closer to the PI values. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Wealth Concentration in Spain 
 
One of the arguments to justify WT is its role in redistributing wealth, so the rationale for 
maintaining this tax might crucially depend on how inequality evolves. However, in Spain, 
there are not studies about wealth concentration due to a historic lack of proper data48. For that 
reason, data from WT could be useful to know the level and evolution of wealth concentration 
during the application of the tax. The lack of proper data to analyze concentration is common in 
many countries. A literature originated in Kuznets (1953) proposes to estimate income 
distribution using fiscal data (see Atkinson and Piketty, forthcoming)49. This methodology 
                                                 
45 Before making the comparison, we have to take into account that Alvaredo and Saez (2006) rectify 
upwards the declared value of real estate in order to consider the MP. Consequently, we have 
reconstructed their interpolated values assessing real estate property according to the CV. We sincerely 
thank Alvaredo and Saez for making us available the annual coefficients they use to rectify the CV. 
However, those values might be slightly upward biased, since they suppose that all reported real estate 
property is assessed according to the CV.  
 
46 The definition of wealth includes all reported goods and rights, including declared business related 
exempts and owner-occupied-dwelling exemption. There are not data in the fiscal statistics about this last 
exemption, but we use our assessed values estimated in the model explained in section 5.3.1. 
 
47 The top difference is 67,523 € in 1991 between R-UB and PI, but in relative terms differences are 
always well below 10%. In fact, differences in 2000 and 2001 are greater, but they might be due the 
different procedure to estimate the value of owner-occupied-dwelling exemption. In our case, we 
followed the methodology explained in section 5.1.1 (see also previous footnote). 
48 Recently, starting in 2002, the Bank of Spain conducted a household wealth survey, similar to the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the 
United States. This survey is supposed to be conducted periodically, but for the time being it is only 
available for year 2002. See Bover (2004) and Bover et al. (2005). 
 
49 Atkinson and Piketty (forthcoming) have recently edited a collective volume with results of income 
distribution for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
and United States. Most of studies follow Kuznets’ methodology. 
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consists of employing income data from tax returns to compute the level of upper incomes and 
national accounts to compute the total income denominator. Hence, by considering all 
population and all income one can deduce from tax data the share of top income recipients in 
total income. A similar process permits to estimate the distribution of wealth.  
 
 
Graph 4. A Comparison of Interpolation Methodologies for Top 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Wealth expressed in 2002 euros. 
Source: Alvaredo and Saez (2006) and own calculations (see note of Table 3) 
 
 
Indeed, wealth tax data can also provide useful information to analyze the distribution of wealth, 
particularly on the upper tail of the distribution, as different studies for the Nordic countries 
shown (Spant, 1987; Tuomala and Vilmunen, 1988; Ohlsson et al., 2006.). Following all this 
literature, Alvaredo and Saez (2006) have recently estimated income and wealth concentration 
for the Spanish case. Regarding the numerator of wealth concentration (i.e., wealth for a top 
percentile) they interpolate fiscal data using PI as we already know, while in the denominator 
(i.e., total wealth from National Accounts) they calculate total net wealth, that is real estate, 
fixed claim assets, stock and other assets minus mortgage debt and other debts. In this paper, we 
will basically perform the same kind of analysis using as numerator the interpolated values 
obtained from Atkinson’s proposed methodology of interpolation, and taking advantage of the 
data presented by Alvaredo and Saez (2006, Table A2, p. 57) to calculate the denominator of 
total wealth.  
 
However, the use of tax data for distribution analysis is not without criticisms. Atkinson (2004) 
points out four potential serious problems: tax evasion, tax avoidance, legal definitions not 
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suitable to study distribution and no contextual data to help to understand the determinants of 
the distribution. Likewise, tax data only provide comparable information along time as long as 
the pattern of tax evasion for richest groups of taxpayers remains equal along time. Further, 
legal changes, such us the change of tax unit, the introduction of new exemptions or the rise in 
the threshold required to declare, may cause additional troubles. In fact, those later 
circumstances occur in Spain, and so we will try to take them into account in the analysis of 
wealth concentration50. 
 
Nonetheless, at the same time tax data have points in their favor, as the very Atkinson affirms. 
Alternative sources also suffer problems: non-reporting or under-reporting by respondents or 
failure to correctly tailor questions particularly if the employed survey is conducted for other 
purposes. And, which is particularly important in the Spanish case, tax data are especially 
relevant when no other sources exist that span along time (see fn. 48). In conclusion, it is 
interesting to analyze the evolution of wealth distribution but being cautious about the possible 
conclusions. 
 
Graph 5. A comparison of assessment criteria: Top 1% Total Wealth Share 
according to Fiscal Criteria vs. Market Price (1983-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: One Refined-Lower Bound (R-LB MP) is calculated taking the 
MP to assess real estate properties, while the other (R-LB FC) is 
calculated taking the fiscal criterion to assess real estates, that is, mainly 
CV. The impact of the owner-occupied-dwelling exemption is assessed 
according to the model explained in section 5.1.1 and shown in section 
5.3.1, but only for R-LB MP. We use the Alvaredo and Saez 
coefficients to estimate MP (see fn. 45). 
 
                                                 
50 Fiscal data excludes two regions, Navarre and Basque Country, because due to a particular financing 
system, they have their own WT. Therefore, the analysis does not include both regions, which account for 
6.3% of the Spanish adult population.  
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The average wealth for top 1% of adult population rises in real terms during the period (see 
Graph 4). Wealth reported in tax returns is assessed according to fiscal criteria, which is 
especially relevant for real estate property, rather under-assessed as we said in the previous 
section. This would provide an untrue image of the wealth distribution, further because the 
denominator, total wealth, is based on national accounts, that is, in MP values. Therefore, to 
know the real weight of wealth held by top 1% of population over total wealth requires 
converting real estate values in MP51. In Graph 5, we show the top 1% share over all wealth 
according to both fiscal criteria (FC) and MP. Indeed, the fiscal criteria would grant a false 
image of wealth distribution. The disparity refers mainly to the absolute value of the series, but 
also to their evolution, as the ratio CV/MP varies along time, as pointed out in Graph 1. The 
introduction of the owner-occupied-housing exemption since 2000 makes this disparity larger. 
The average difference is almost 8 percentage points, with a minimum value in 1998, 6.55 
points, and a maximum at 9.84 points in 2001.  
 
In Graph 6 we compare our series with those obtained by Alvaredo and Saez (2006). Although 
our estimations are slightly higher, on average around one percentage point, the two series 
evolve in a quite similar way, except since the introduction of the housing exemption. Due to 
the absence of fiscal data, we have estimated its value according to the procedure established in 
section 5.3.1. General speaking it appears wealth concentration goes down between 1983 and 
2001. However, before making that assertion, we must consider an important legal modification 
which could alter this initial impression.  
 
The tax unit changes since 1988 when the compulsory joint taxation for marriages was replaced 
by an exclusively individual system. Consequently, wealth held by marriages was split into two 
tax units, one for each spouse52, which logically reduces the concentration of wealth in 1988 
compared to the previous years. Recall top 1% is made of adult population, which only 
coincides with the number of taxpayers since 1988, but before that date means including more 
persons, since in joint tax units there are two persons. Obviously, the concentration of reported 
wealth must be greater, as more person’s wealth is included, than when the top 1% is only 
formed by individual tax units. This legal change in the tax unit does not appear to be 
considered by Alvaredo and Saez (2006), but it seems to be relevant because, as Graph 6 
illustrates, there is an important fall on the wealth share held by top 1% in 1988, in fact the most 
                                                 
51 Recall business assets and shares not traded in the stock market are not reported according to MP, but 
we do not have enough information to convert them in real prices. However, they account for a much 
smaller share of wealth. 
 
52 How wealth is distributed between spouses depends on the marriage settlements, but the most common 
settlement in Spain establishes an equal distribution of wealth obtained during the marriage.  
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important annual fall of the period53. Therefore, in order to obtain a correct conclusion about the 
evolution of wealth concentration, we should start the analysis since 198854. Before, between 
1983 and 1987, our results suggest there is a fall in the concentration level, while Alvaredo and 
Saez’ results indicate concentration remains quite stable.   
 
Graph 6. A Comparison with Alvaredo & Saez (2006): 
Evolution of Top 1% Total Wealth Share (1983-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alvaredo and Saez (2006) and own calculations.  
Note: The values of the impact of the owner-occupied dwelling exemption 
are assessed according to the model explained in section 5.1.1 and shown in 
section 5.3.1. We use two alternative degrees of utilization of “MP” as 
criterion of assessment of housing: 50% (R-LB max) and 10% (R-LB min). 
We use the Alvaredo and Saez coefficients to estimate MP of real estates. 
 
From 1988 to 2001, we can identify four different sub-periods: 1988-1992, the top 1%’s share 
goes down; 1992-1995, it remains rather stable; 1995-1997, it rises; and from 1997, the 
evolution of the two series is diverse because while the share for the PI stays stable, our results 
indicate a clear increase in the concentration of wealth, especially since 2000. Therefore, both 
series show a fairly similar evolution, except once the owner-occupied-housing exemption is 
introduced. Again, a fiscal change alters the estimated shares and the possible conclusions. 
Alvaredo and Saez results illustrate top 1%’s share of wealth remains stable during the 1988-
2001 period. On the contrary, our results point out a rise in the level of wealth concentration 
(see fn. 47).  
                                                 
53 The change in tax unit derives from a Constitutional Court sentence declaring unconstitutional 
compulsory joint taxation for marriages in the income tax. Consequently, the government also changed 
the tax unit of WT, which then on is only individual. That could have provoked a rise in the number of 
taxpayers, but the government decided at the same time an outstanding increase in the threshold. The 
overall effect was as 15% fall in the number of taxpayers. 
 
54 An alternative would be to convert tax units in persons, but the lack of proper information in Spain to 
find a liable value of conversion for top taxpayers makes us to give up this possibility. 
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Table 4. % Composition of Wealth for Top 1% 
Year Housing 
Equity 
Shares 
Other assets Total 
1983 65.87 11.16 22.98 100.01 
1984 67.19 11.10 21.71 100.00 
1985 66.66 11.76 21.58 100.00 
1986 65.04 13.65 21.31 100.00 
1987 63.46 14.95 21.59 100.00 
1988 62.04 17.09 20.87 100.00 
1989 63.89 16.54 19.57 100.00 
1990 65.28 14.62 20.11 100.00 
1991 67.52 15.40 17.08 100.00 
1992 64.17 17.44 18.40 100.00 
1993 62.35 20.26 17.39 100.00 
1994 61.90 20.98 17.12 100.00 
1995 60.66 21.85 17.49 100.00 
1996 59.47 24.64 15.89 100.00 
1997 56.27 29.66 14.07 100.00 
1998 54.51 32.34 13.15 100.00 
1999 55.41 31.05 13.55 100.01 
2000 55.83 29.77 14.40 100.00 
2001 58.37 27.45 14.18 100.00 
Source: Alvaredo and Saez (2006).  
Note: Composition based on fiscal data. Housing net of debts and assessed according to 
MP using transformation coefficients provided by Alvaredo and Saez. 
 
To be able to go further in this analysis, we are going now to concentrate on the particular 
evolution of the two main assets in the composition of wealth, real estates and shares, which 
represent the greatest part of all wealth (Table 4). Our purpose is to know how their evolutions 
influence on the overall share of top 1%.  
 
The weight of housing and equity shares over all wealth varies along time for top 1% (Table 4). 
To know if each one follows the same evolution or differs, we have decomposed the annual 
variation in the general wealth share into separate parts for the Refined-Lower Bound (Table 5). 
Thus, we isolate the effect according to the type of asset that causes the change: housing and 
equity shares, while the rest is assigned to the remaining assets. The evolution is also shown 
graphically (Graph 7) for the R-LB.  
 
Table 5. Annual Variation in the Wealth Share of Top 1% 
 84-83 85-84 86-85 87-86 88-87 89-88 90-89 91-90 92-91 93-92 94-93 95-94 96-95 97-96 98-97 99-98 00-99 01-00 01-88 
All 
wealth 
-0.93 0.18 0.49 -1.22 -1.50 -0.28 -0.04 -0.64 -0.23 0.45 -0.34 -0.54 0.68 0.60 -0.08 0.47 1.34 0.03 1.43 
Housing -0.35 0.01 -0.02 -1.10 -1.21 0.16 0.23 -0.03 -0.73 -0.03 -0.29 -0.54 0.21 -0.22 -0.36 0.42 0.83 0.52 0.16 
Equity 
shares 
-0.12 0.15 0.45 0.09 0.17 -0.15 -0.35 0.04 0.31 0.57 0.06 0.03 0.63 1.05 0.46 -0.08 0.17 -0.45 2.28 
Other -0.47 0.01 0.05 -0.21 -0.45 -0.29 0.09 -0.65 0.19 -0.09 -0.11 -0.03 -0.16 -0.23 -0.18 0.13 0.35 -0.04 -1.02 
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Graph 7. Evolution of Top 1% Shares on All Wealth, Housing and Equity Shares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before changing the tax unit in 1988, the top 1% share in housing falls more than one 
percentage point, which is partly compensated by a light increase in the concentration of equity 
shares. Once individual tax unit is introduced, housing concentration shows a reducing trend, 
partly compensated by a growth in the concentration of equity shares. Therefore, each asset has 
an opposite effect. However, the process for housing upturned the last year of the period, when 
there is a rise in concentration and, consequently, the final level of all concentration is slightly 
greater than at the beginning. Regarding concentration of equity shares, there is a quite steady 
increase throughout the period until 2000, when starts a more stable evolution.  
 
In conclusion, between 1988 and 2001 the overall level of concentration remains very stable for 
housing but rises for equity shares. Generally speaking, housing evolution reduces concentration 
while equity shares increases it. However, this seems to change for the last years of the period, 
when housing prices are booming and starts an increasing concentration process. And at the 
same time, the concentration of equity shares remains more stable, and so does not contribute to 
increase wealth inequality in contrast with the previous years. In fact, housing and equity shares 
concentration very often varies in opposite ways. Shady cells of Table 5 mean housing and 
equity variations have opposite signs, that is, when one goes up the other goes down. The stock 
market booming period starting in 1996 provokes an increase in the concentration level, but the 
evolution of housing share partly offset that effect. The subsequent fall of stock market reduces 
concentration, but this change is again partly offset by the increasing share in housing.  
 
Nevertheless, fiscal data may give a misunderstanding picture of the evolution in wealth 
concentration if tax evasion does not remain stable along time, as we mentioned before when 
24
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
17%
19%
21%
23%
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Real Declared 
pointing out the criticisms of using fiscal data. In the model explained in the next section, we 
estimate the possible impact of tax fraud as far as housing and equity shares in organized 
markets are concerned. In particular, as indicated in section 5.4, the gap between declared 
housing values and the real ones, regardless the existing level of under-assessment due to fiscal 
criteria, is quite high and increasing along time, especially when housing prices are booming. 
For that reason, we calculate the top 1%’s share taking the results obtained in the empirical 
model, that for housing includes the level of under-assessment, the owner-occupied-dwelling 
exemption and the level of tax fraud. The results are shown in Graph 8 and also suggest 
concentration increases between 1988 and 2001. The impact of the housing exemption is 
probably under-assessed, as we will explain in the section 5.3.1, but regardless this issue, the 
results suggest again an increase in the share of wealth held by top 1% of adult population.  
 
The share of top 1% (Graph 8) varies between a minimum value of 17.80% (1995) up to close 
to 20% from 2000, being on average 18.84%. This average value is two percentage points 
greater than the one calculated by Alvaredo and Saez, 16.77%. Compared to other countries 
(Table 6), the level of wealth concentration in Spain does not seem to be high, although 
differences in the unit of analysis or in the employed data may difficult comparisons among 
countries55. For similar periods, the concentration of wealth also rises in Italy, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom, while it goes down in the United States. 
 
Graph 8. Tax Incompliance: Declared vs. Real Wealth. Top 1% Share (1988-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Real wealth is calculated adding to declared wealth real estate 
properties at MP and tax incompliance, according to section 5.4. The 
owner-occupied-dwelling exemption is considered in both series.  
 
                                                 
55 See Davies et al. (2006) for a wider comparison of wealth distribution within countries and the 
methodology difficulties. 
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Table 6. Wealth Concentration for Other Countries. Top 1% 
Country Period Unit Average Minimum Maximum 
France 1994 Adult 21.30% - - 
Italy 1989-2000 Household 11.55% 9 % 
in 1991 
13.80% 
in 2000 
Spain 1983-2001 Adult 18.84% 
17.80% 
in 1995 
19.90% 
in 2000 
Switzerland 1981-1997 Family 33.80% 33.04% 
in 1981 
34.80% 
in 1997 
UK 1988-2001 Adult 19.64% 17% 
in 1988 
23% 
in 2000 
US 1988-2000 Adult 21.43% 20.79% 
in 2000 
21.96%  
in 1989 
Source: Piketty et al. (2006), for France; Brandolini et al. (2004), for Italy; Dell et al. (2005), for 
Switzerland; Revenue & Customs (2006) for the UK; Kopczuk and Saez (2004), for the US. For 
Spain, the values are assessed according to market price and rectified by tax incompliance for real 
estate property. 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section, we will first establish the empirical framework we will use to assess the 
effectiveness of WT in taxing real tax capacity. Next, we will carry out the empirical analysis. 
We will do it for the two most important assets taxed in the Spanish WT, housing and equity 
shares, and for top 1% of adult population.  
 
5.1.Empirical framework 
 
We assume the following simple functional form of declared values at WT for any asset: 
 
( )βRtRtDtDt qpqp ×=  [1] 
 
where p is the price of the asset, and q , the physical quantity of the asset (i.e., number of 
houses or number of equity shares), while β  is a parameter to be empirically estimated. 
Subscripts D and R stand for declared and real variables, respectively, while t indicates the 
moment of time. Thus, we suppose that declared values keep a certain relationship with the real 
ones, both regarding the price and the quantity. This is the justification of the above expression. 
Obviously, the declared values could be randomly chosen or could remain at the same level 
independently of the real ones. That is why, the above expression is not an identity and should 
be transformed in the following way: 
 
( ) teeqpqp KRtRtDtDt µβ ×××=  [2] 
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where K is a constant term, while tu is a random error with the usual properties. In order to 
empirically estimate expression [2], we linearize it taking (natural) logs: 
 
( ) tRtRtDtDt uKqpqp +++= logloglog 21 ββ  [3] 
 
The parameters 1β  and 2β  can be directly interpreted as elasticities, that is, as the percentage 
change in the declared value of an asset when its real price or its quantity varies in 1%, 
respectively. As long as pR is a perfect indicator of the real price of the asset, the maximum 
(minimum) value of 1β should be equal to one (zero). In particular, for a given value of K, if 
11 =β ( 01 =β ), we should conclude that the level of tax compliance is 100% (0%)56,57. 
However, given that we do not have micro-data, but only aggregate data, we will only be able to 
employ imperfect indicators of the real prices (i.e., basically, average values) of the declared 
assets in the WT by top 1%58. This limitation makes it necessary to re-interpret the coefficient 
β  in expression [2]. That is why, we have introduced in [3] a different β  for pR and for qR. If 
the proxy we use for the price of the asset wrongly estimates its real value, 1β will include both 
the degree of tax compliance, θ ( 10 ≤≤ θ ), but also the very degree of under or over 
assessment of the most appropriate price for top 1%, δ  ( 0≥δ ): 
 
( ) teeqpqp KRtRtDtDt µθδ ×××=  [2’] 
 
Thus, even if there is full tax compliance ( 1=θ ), the estimated elasticity with respect to the 
indicator of the price of the asset might be less (more) than 1 as long as our price indicator over-
values (under-values) the real price of the asset, that is, 1<δ ( 1>δ ). As we will explain later, 
by means of our empirical analysis, we will try to disentangle both effects as far as housing is 
concerned.  
 
According to what we commented in section 3, the Spanish AC’s administer this tax since the 
                                                 
56 Later on, we will call the level of tax compliance obtained given K and per dwelling as marginal tax 
compliance. 
 
57 This empirical framework does not permit us to detect the non-compliance due to “ghosts”, that is, to 
nonfilers (see, e.g., Erard and Ho, 2001). 
 
58 For instance, on the one hand, given the supposed better financial information at hands of rich people 
and their better processing (Peress, 2003), we would expect that their financial portfolio generated returns 
over an average stock index. Similarly, on the other hand, regarding real estate, it is reasonable to suppose 
that their housing prices are well above average values, since most of them probably live in exclusive 
areas. On the whole, in both cases the use of average prices for the assets of top 1% can only be regarded 
as a proxy of their real prices.  
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beginning of the eighties. Until 1987, the equalization grant system generated an implicit 100% 
“tax on tax revenue”, since any increase in the amount of tax collected by the AC’s supposed a 
decrease in the amount of unconditional grant received from the central government. Thus, we 
would expect that the parameter θ  in expression [2’] (and so of β  in expression [3]) were 
lower for the 1983-1986 period due to the a priori (very) low incentive of AC’s to collect tax 
revenue, including that yielding by the WT59. We will try to take this into account in the 
empirical analysis60. In principle, this reasoning applies both to housing and to equity shares. 
 
Finally, we will try to control for Rq  by means of proxies of the propensity to accumulate each 
type of asset (including the variable income as independent variable), of the cost of debt 
(interest rate), or of the financial profitability of alternative assets (e.g., long interest rate). 
However, given the impreciseness of the estimation of Rq , these variables will have to be 
considered just as controls, while the main conclusions of our empirical analysis will be derived 
from the estimates of pR.  
 
We will apply this empirical framework to two assets, housing (only urban dwellings) and 
equity shares, which prices are more easily available and in any case their price indicators can 
be considered as most reliable. On average these two assets account for about 60% of total 
wealth declared by top 1%61. Hence, we expect the conclusions obtained from their analysis to 
be rather descriptive of the performance of the wealth tax in taxing real tax capacity. In the next 
two sections, we explain the specificities of each one of those assets. 
 
5.1.1. Housing 
 
In the case of housing, the variable pR in expression [2’] is not only conditioned by the degree of 
under or over assessment, but also by the fiscal rules concerning the appropriate price to be 
assigned to each dwelling in the WT return (see section 3). Although most of the times the CV 
is the price used to assess the monetary value of a dwelling, we already know that according to 
the fiscal law the price of acquisition (i.e., an old “MP”) has to (or should) be used when it is 
                                                 
59 This hypothesis is similar to the one tested and empirically confirmed by Baretti et al. (2002) for the 
case of the German Länder. 
 
60 Recall from section 4.2, that by 1988, the data might also be affected by the change of the tax unit. This 
latter fact makes that before 1988 the data is upwards biased, while the “tax on tax revenue” points out in 
the opposite direction. In the empirical section, it will not be possible to disentangle both effects, and so 
we will estimate a net effect. 
 
61 These percentages are calculated according to the declared values, while in Table 4 recall the declared 
value of housing was rectified in order to re-assess it according to market price. 
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above the CV62 (see also fn. 32). That is, at any moment of time, the (real) price of each 
dwelling in fiscal terms is the following: 
 
αα −
=
1CVMPpR  [4] 
 
where α is the degree of utilization of the “MP” in order to assess dwellings, according to the 
fiscal legislation63; and MP is the market price. It is well known that the CV tends to under-
assess the MP, so δδ MPWCV ×= −1 , such that 10 ≤≤ δ  and W is a constant (see next fn. 64). 
This constant will be very useful in the exploitation of the results of the empirical analysis. 
Taking all this into account, expression [4] can be rewritten as follows: 
 
[ ] )1)(1()1(1)1( αδαδααδδα −−−+−− == WMPMPWMPpR  [4’] 
 
Similarly, if we substitute by CV instead of by MP, expression [4] now becomes: 
 
δ
δα
αδ
α
α
α
δ
δ
δ
)1(
)1(
1
11 −
−+
−
−
=








= WCVCVWCVpR  [4’’] 
 
We will take for granted this relationship between the CV and the MP. Then, in order to avoid 
problems of colinearity between these two variables, we will employ each price indicator in a 
different regression, keeping constant the rest of the parameters of the models (i.e., the proxies 
of qR). Therefore, when we employ the CV as the real price indicator, we will obtain the 
following elasticity (from the estimation of expression [11], that we will later explain): 
 




−+=≡ )1(ˆˆ
,
αδ
αθβε CVCVpD  [5] 
 
where we have assumed that the degree of tax compliance, θ , is independent of the assessment 
criterion; while, in contrast, when we use the MP,  
[ ]δααθβε )1(ˆˆ
,
−+=≡ MPMPpD  [6] 
                                                 
62 The taxpayer might declare according to the CV even if the MP is higher. Thus, the parameter α, which 
is defined next, might also be implicitly affected by the degree of tax compliance. 
 
63 Note that from expression [4], it is not possible to infer directly the percentage in the fiscal use of one 
or another price indicator, since pR is expressed as a geometric mean of MP and CV. That percentage 
should be calculated employing the following formula: ( )αMPCVpCV R = .This applies to all the rest 
of interpretations of the coefficients we will use.  
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 Thus, these two estimates permit us to obtain an estimate ofδ , since combining both 
expressions, we have that
CV
MP
β
βδ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ≡ 64. Given δˆ , we cannot estimate point values of θ  and ofα , 
but a range for each one of them compatible with MPβˆ and with CVβˆ . For instance, from 
expression [5], we have  
CVβ
αδα
δθ ˆ
)1(ˆ
ˆ
−+
=  [7] 
 
Hence, the estimated elasticity of the declared value of an asset with respect to any price 
indicator does not have a direct interpretation, but depends on the value of α  and ofθ , which 
we do not know, although according to what we explained in section 3 the reasonable value of 
α  should be close to zero. That is, according to [7], the most likely is that CVβθ ˆˆ→ . In general, 
if 1=α  (maximum value), the degree of under-assessment is irrelevant, and we obtain the 
minimum (estimated) value ofθ , MPβˆ , while for 0=α (minimum value), we obtain the 
maximum value of θ , CVβˆ . That is, 1ˆˆˆ0 ≤≤≤≤ CVMP βθβ , so we will be able to assure that 
there is tax incompliance only as long as 1ˆ <CVβ . In any case, recall that this level of tax 
compliance is per unit of dwelling and given the value of the constant, K. This is what we call 
marginal tax compliance. Thus, even if we do not mention the adjective “marginal”, we have to 
understand that this is the proper significance of the level of tax compliance we will talk about 
from now on. In section 5.4, from the results of the empirical analysis, we will also try to 
calculate the absolute levels of tax compliance, that is, taking into account the constant K and 
for the whole amount of dwellings per taxpayer. 
 
Interestingly, given the relationship established by [7] betweenα  and θ, and expression [4’] (or 
expression [4’’]), we can infer the importance of each factor (marginal tax compliance and 
                                                 
64 According to the previously established relationship: δδ MPWCV ×= −1 , we can calculate the 
percentage of under-assessment expressed in linear terms, ( ) ( ) 1−= δWMPMPCV , which is not constant 
but evolves according to MP. Thus, given the estimate ofδ , we have to calculate W for each year. To do 
so, we just use the following equality that must hold for each year: 
δ
α
αα
δ
δ
αδααδ
ˆ
1
ˆ
1ˆ
)1(ˆ)1)(ˆ1( +−








−
−+−− ×=× tttt CVWMPW (i.e., expression [4’] and [4’’] must be equal), from which 
we obtain 
CVMP
CV
MP
t
t
t
CV
MP
W
ββ
β
β ˆˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
−







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= , where recall MPβˆ and CVβˆ are the estimated elasticities of the 
declared value with respect to the market price and the cadastral value, respectively. Note that this 
procedure is no more than replicating the real MPCV . 
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under-assessment) in the declared price, Dp , with respect to the real price (given a value of α ): 
 
[ ] [ ]
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[ ]
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( )[ ] ( )
4444 34444 21444444 3444444 21
4444 34444 214444 34444 214444 34444 21
(%) assessment-Under
)ˆ1)(1()1ˆ)(1(
(%) ComplianceTax  Gross
)ˆ1)(1(1ˆ)1(1
(%) assessment-Under
)1(
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ)1(
(%) ComplianceTax  Gross
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ)1(
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ)1(
(%) ComplianceTax Net 
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ)1(
*
          δαδαδαθδααθ
αα
δαδαα
δαδαα
δαθδααθδαθδααθ
−−−−−−−−+−
−+
−−−+
−−−+
−−−+−−−+
×××=
=
×
×
×
×
=
×
=
WMPWMP
MP
WMP
WMP
WMP
MP
WMP
p
p
R
D
  [8] 
 
where 
*Rp is the real price in absence of under-assessment and of tax incompliance65. We then 
calculate the importance of gross tax compliance comparing the obtained elasticity with that 
that would have been obtained for θ=1, but 1ˆ <δ ; while the importance of under-assessment is 
similarly calculated, but keeping θ=1 in both cases, and comparing with respect to 1=δ . We 
define the multiplication of the % of gross tax compliance and the % of under-assessment as the 
% of marginal net tax compliance. Thus, the percentage of net tax compliance evolves along 
time according to the evolution of both factors. In section 5.3.1, we will calculate expression 
[8]. In order to do it, among other exploitation of our empirical results, given the value ofδ , we 
will fixα  (the parameter about which we can have a priori more information), which also 
implies a certain value ofθ , and will analyze how net tax compliance and each of its factors 
evolve along time. In this way, our empirical framework will permit us to analyze to what 
extent the WT achieves taxing real tax capacity, and comparing the results with those obtained 
for equity shares to ascertain whether there is any difference in this achievement between both 
assets. Note that in order to know the level of net tax compliance is not necessary the above 
decomposition. However, it is obviously interesting to know it, since the design of the tax 
policy aimed at obtaining a higher level of net tax compliance depends on the importance of 
each factor. If gross tax compliance is predominant, a more severe tax auditing policy is needed, 
while if the degree of under-assessment is relatively more important an update of cadastral 
values (joint with a check of the proper use of α from the fiscal point of view) should be 
priority.  
 
Nevertheless, this basic framework is not valid from 2000 onwards. As we already know from 
section 3, in 2000, the government introduced an exemption for the owner-occupied dwelling. 
In particular, the maximum amount to be deducted from the declared price was set at 161,148 
                                                 
65 If we knew the value of α that legally should hold, α*, and the one that is effectively applied we could 
also add another factor of decomposition, the % of fiscal underutilization of the market price. However, 
both real values are unknown to us (see also fn. 62). 
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euros (expressed in prices of 2002)66. Ceteris paribus, this fact can be interpreted as a change in 
the real price to be included in the regression in the following way: 
 
( ) ( ){ } λλαβαββαβαλλ −−−−−− −− == 1''111 OOORAE pEMPECVppp  [9] 
 
where RAEp is the price after the introduction of the exemption,
Op is the price of the owner-
occupied dwelling and −Op is the price of the rest of dwellings. The definition of the price of 
both kinds of dwellings follows the pattern already established by means of expression [4]. We 
distinguish between Op and −Op , as recall the exemption only applies to the former dwellings. 
Thus, pR only changes with respect to the share of owner-occupied dwellings, λ . The 
exemption makes that all those dwellings below the maximum monetary amount of the 
exemption, E, are not taxed at all, while the rest are taxed according to the net price, CV/E or 
MP/E, depending on the criteria of assessment. Then, in expression [9], β is the % of those 
dwellings assessed according to the CV (see fn. 63) that apply 100% of the exemption (i.e., their 
price is above E), while β’ has the same interpretation but for those dwellings assessed 
according to the MP. 
 
Hence, the fiscal impact of the exemption on pR is the following:  
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where RBEp is the price before the introduction of the exemption. Thus, a priori the exemption 
has a level effect through E, but also an effect on the elasticity through affecting the slope of pR. 
However, given that β  and 'β are probably very small, we expect the latter to dominate the 
former. The effect of the exemption can also be expressed in terms of the MP: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )( ){ } ( )[ ]'11111'11 αββαλβαδλβαβδαλ +−−−−−−−+−−
= EVMP
p
p
R
BE
R
AE  [10’] 
 
where V is the parameter that relates the CV and the MP of those owner-occupied dwellings that 
                                                 
66 In real terms, the value of the (maximum) exemption has decreased, since the initial value expressed in 
nominal terms has not been indexed according to the inflation rate. That is why, in 2001 the maximum 
amount of the exemption was 155,572 euros, and in 2002 it was 150,253 euros. All amounts are also 
expressed in euros of 2002. 
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do not fully apply the exemption, and which account for ( )[ ])1'()1(1 −+−− βαβαλ of total 
dwellings declared in the WT67; in terms of the CV: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ } ( )[ ]'11'11'11 αββαλβαδδ
λβαβδα
δ
λ
+−−
−−−+−−
= EVCV
p
p
R
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R
AE  [10’’] 
 
Expressions [10’] and [10’’] should be equal. In order to get such equality, we must obtain the 
parameter V, just as we did when in absence of the exemption, we calculated W (see fn. 64), 
which is crucial in order to develop the decomposition established in expression [8]. Now the 
calculus of V will be crucial to infer the estimated impact of the exemption on tax collection. In 
order to calculate V, we suppose 0'== ββ . 
 
On the whole, regarding housing, the basic model we will estimate is the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where 2000≥D is a dummy equal to 1 for the year 2000 onwards in order to control for the 
exemption of the owner-occupied dwelling (expression [10’] or [10’’]), while the dummy 
1986≤D  controls for the hypothetical lower incentive of the tax administration to force tax 
compliance due to the 100% “tax on tax revenue” before 1988; GDP controls for income and 
Si is a short term interest rate, in particular, the most common one year interest rate used for the 
mortgages, which is so-called MIBOR. We expect 01 ≥β , 02 ≤β , 03 ≤β , 04 ≥β  and 05 ≤β . As 
we have shown before, from the combination of the estimates of the elasticity of declared values 
with respect to pR, we will be able to obtain an estimate of the degree of under-assessment and 
of the level of marginal tax compliance depending on the degree of utilization of each price 
according to the fiscal legislation. 
 
5.1.2. Equity shares 
 
The price used to assess those equity shares traded in organized markets is their average official 
MP for the last three months of the year. We will employ the official MP which is available for 
the longest period of time, in particular, the Madrid Stock Index (in Spanish, “Índice General de 
la Bolsa de Madrid”, IGBM). Then, in the case of equity shares, the equation we will estimate is 
the following: 
                                                 
67 Therefore, the value of δ (and in comparison with W, that of the constant V in [10’] and [10’’]) that 
appears in expression [10] is not necessarily the same than that in expressions [5] or [6]. 
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 ( ) teeqIGBMqp KRttDtDt µθ ×××=  [12] 
 
The elasticity we will estimate with respect to IGBM will be interpreted as marginal tax 
compliance68.  
 
In contrast with housing, there is some additional specificity related with the fact that the price 
is expressed as an index, and not as euros per asset. Thus, in a similar way to expression [8], 
marginal tax compliance is calculated as: 
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That is, we will have to multiply the value of the ration by 10
−θ
IGBM , where IGBM0 is the MP 
in the base year, 1983. Unfortunately, we do not have that value, although we can provide a 
relatively reasonable range for it. In order to obtain that reasonable value, we proceed as 
follows. We look for the current MP of those firms which MP is considered to obtain the IGBM. 
Then, comparing the current index price of those firms (about 1,580) with that in the last 
trimester of 1983 (about 122), we are able to obtain a MP expressed in 2002 euros for all those 
firms that are currently taken into account in order to calculate the IGBM. This is simply an 
approximation, as some of the businesses included in the calculus of the index were not 
included in the index calculated in 1983. Operating in this way, we obtain that the average MP 
in 1983 were 5.52€ (or 5.45€, if we calculate a weighted average using the weights attached to 
each firm in the calculus of the index), expressed in 2002 euros. We will use this value as a 
reference in order to obtain a reasonable range of values for tax compliance in the case of equity 
shares. 
 
On the whole, in the case of equity shares, the basic model we will estimate is the following: 
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68 We also run a regression using another stock market index, so-called IBEX-35. This index is supposed 
to be more selective in the choice of the firms included, as it includes the 35 largest Spanish corporations. 
However, during the analyzed period the evolution of both indexes has not differed much. Hence, there is 
not a clear presumption about which one is a more precise indicator for the shares owned by top 1%, and 
so in the case of equity shares we cannot disentangle tax compliance from under-assessment, if this latter 
factor is present. Therefore, we decided to work with IGBM, since IBEX-35 is only available from 1990. 
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 GDP controls for income and Li for a long term interest rate as proxy of the relative 
profitability of investing in equity shares, while again 1986≤D  is a dummy variable to control for 
the supposed lower incentives of the AC’s to force tax compliance before 1988. We expect 
01 ≥β , 02 ≤β , 03 ≥β  and 04 ≤β . In 1994, the government introduced an exemption for 
family business without any limit, but subject to certain conditions (sees fn. 35). Thus, given 
that there is not any limit in the value of this exemption, its inclusion will be easier than in the 
case of housing, and will be controlled just by means of a dummy from 1994 onwards, 1994≥D , 
which sign we obviously expect to be negative. In 1997, a 95% deduction was also introduced 
in the Inheritance and Gift Tax (IGT), which conditions were similar to those established in the 
WT. We will also test whether this new deduction generates a cross-effect between the IGT and 
the WT.  
 
5.2. Data 
 
Reported wealth is based on taxpayer’s returns. Data are gathered into several intervals and 
published each year by the Ministry of Finance in the “Memoria de la Administración 
Tributaria”.  
 
In section 4, we obtained an upper and a lower bound of total declared wealth for top 1%. Then, 
in absence of a clear-cut theory regarding the pattern of wealth composition by levels of wealth, 
we performed a simple linear interpolation to calculate the wealth composition of that 
percentile. Those values will be our endogenous variables in the empirical analysis. In 
particular, on the one hand, we will regress housing wealth (only urban dwellings), and on the 
other hand, we will do the same for equity shares, differentiating between the total monetary 
amount of equity shares and only of those traded in organized markets, since only for the latter 
we have been able to obtain a reliable price indicator.  
 
In order to analyze the evolution of reported values, we will the make use of the following 
exogenous variables, which source is external to the fiscal database:  
 
 Value of dwellings: on the one hand, the market price (MP) has been obtained from the 
Spanish Ministry responsible for Public Works (“Ministerio de Fomento”)69. The statistics 
                                                 
69 Those market values are obtained from the assessments carried out by the financial entities – through a 
corresponding expert valuation - in order to set the maximum value of a mortgage. That is why, we 
expect those values to be upward biased. The full report of the Ministry of Public Works can be 
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also offer information for capitals and for exclusive areas of the big cities (from zone 1, 
where prices are the highest to zone 4, where prices are the lowest). Data are only available 
since 1987. On the other hand, the Cadastral Value (CV), which is available for the whole 
period, is assessed by a national agency (so-called “Dirección General del Catastro”) for the 
property tax, but it is well below the market value. In the official statistics, the CV is 
expressed per urban unit, while the MP is expressed by square meter. That is why, we have 
multiplied each year the latter by 125 square meters, in such a way that the absolute values 
of the resulting MP per urban unit are equal to those employed by García-Vaquero and 
Martínez (2005). 
 
 Index of publicly traded shares: it is obtained from the general index of the Stock Market of 
Madrid (IGBM). We calculate its value for each year by applying the wealth tax criterion of 
assessment, that is, the average value of its MP for the last three months of the year.  
 
 Other data: data about the National Gross Domestic Product (having excluded the Basque 
Country and Navarra, since the endogenous variable does not include the declared wealth of 
those regions) and consumer prices (necessary to transform monetary amounts expressed in 
nominal terms into real terms) have been obtained from the Spanish Statistical Institute 
(INE). As short term interest rate we use the so-called MIBOR, the most common index of 
reference for the mortgage market; while as long term interest rate we employ the interest 
rate of Public Debt for a period between three and six years. Both indexes are annually 
published by the Bank of Spain. 
 
In Table 7, we show the main descriptive statistics of the data employed in the empirical 
analysis. As we can check, those equity shares traded in organized markets represent on average 
about 35% of total equity shares. Regarding CV, on average this is 22.33% of the average MP, 
but only 10% of the price of those dwellings in the most exclusive areas of Barcelona and 
Madrid. Obviously, this latter comparison is not fully correct, as we should also have the 
average of the CV in those areas in order to offer a proper comparison. 
 
5.3. Results 
 
We have carried out the empirical analysis for housing (section 5.3.1) and for equity shares 
(section 5.3.2) employing as endogenous variable the amount of wealth obtained both from the 
refined lower and upper bounds in section 4. However, the resulting empirical results from both 
                                                                                                                                               
downloaded from: http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/F401ADD0-1B62-4FFB-BD5E-
AEEE43379DC4/3693/ivivienda.pdf (last accessed 2/21/2007).  
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interpolated values are almost identical. That is why, we will usually only comment those 
obtained from the Refined Lower Bound (R-LB), although we will also show the results from 
the Refined Upper Bound (R-UB). 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
 Average Max Min 
Standard 
deviation 
Interpolated Wealth per adult (Top 1%) 
R-LB (Dwellings) 215,850 245,875 179,137 20,501 
R-UB (Dwellings) 217,847 246,810 179,142 21,317 
R-LB (Total Equity Shares) 173,271 218,942 140,902 22,851 
R-UB (Total Equity Shares) 174,818 219,418 141,490 23,006 
R-LB (Equity Shares traded in organized 
markets) 
60,194 108,058 30,301 23,810 
R-UB (Equity Shares traded in organized 
markets) 
60,620 108,062 30,427 23,659 
Real Estate Price 
CV (per urban unit) 24,476 36,299 15,478 5,787 
Market price (p.u.u.)* 108,687 152,616 74,693 18,144 
Market price (capitals) (p.u.u.)* 134,470 216,344 82,377 29,564 
Market price (BCN & Mad, zones 1&2) 
(p.u.u.)* 
222,328 327,307 129,749 45,011 
Market price (BCN & Mad, most exclusive 
zones: 1) (p.u.u.)* 
244,073 355,284 144,251 48,903 
Equity Shares Index 
IGBM (Madrid Stock Exchange index) 165.055 327.120 87.970 75.896 
Proxies of Propensity to Save 
Interest rate (short run) (%) 6.840 13.664 0.431 4.201 
Interest rate (long run) (%) 5.925 10.310 0.428 3.308 
GDP 13,309 17,801 9,615 2,541 
Note: Monetary amounts are expressed in 2002 euros. 
*: only available since 1987 
 
 
5.3.1. Housing 
 
Before commenting the results of the empirical analysis, in Graph 9 we show the temporal 
evolution of the average declared value of top 1% from the results of the R-LB vs. both price 
indicators (CV and MP). All percentage values are expressed as annual (log) variation rates. In 
2000, the declared value shows an important fall, which (to a great extent) must be due to the 
introduction of the exemption of the owner-occupied dwelling. In the empirical analysis, we 
control for this fact as we justified in section 5.1.1. (see expression [11]). That is why, in the 
graph we have also included a new series of the declared value (DVr) having used the estimates 
of the empirical analysis to correct the original series. Even after having controlled for the 
impact of the exemption, the declared value shows a moderate estimated decrease in 2000 (-
4.5%). The increase of the declared values in 1999 (above the increase in the CV, which is very 
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abnormal according to what we observe in the graph for the whole period) could be due to an 
increase in the use of the MP in the WT as assessment criterion. This makes sense, since at that 
moment the prices in the housing market started a sharp increase, in part, due to an increasing 
demand of new houses (Rodríguez, 2006). Then, the corrected series of the declared value in 
Graph 9 should be interpreted as a conservative estimate of the impact of the exemption, as we 
have calculated it supposing the fiscal use of the MP is 10%. If we suppose that since then on 
the MP is used more often, the estimated impact of the exemption is greater, and so declared 
values should not have necessarily decreased (see the note of the graph). 
 
 
Graph 9: Evolution of Declared Values of Housing (1984-2001): 
Cadastral Value vs. Market Price 
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Note: the percentages of real annual variations are log points (that is, e.g., the series of the MP 
is calculated as logMPt+1-logMPt). The DV are calculated using the R-LB. The impact of the 
exemption – which is obtained using expression [10’] – permits us to obtain a corrected series 
of the declared values (DVr). Once we assume β= β’=0, the impact of the exemption is equal 
to αδα
δαβ
β +−
−−
)1(
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ
ˆ
2
2VMP , where 2βˆ  is the estimated elasticity that accounts for the exemption in 
expression [11] when we use the MP. Therefore, the impact depends on α, while V was 
calculated following a procedure similar to that explained in fn. (64). The greater the value of 
α, the greater the impact of the exemption. In the graph, we have assumed α =0.075, which 
approximately corresponds with a percentage of fiscal use of the MP equal to 10%. In fact, for 
low values of α, the quantification of the exemption does not vary much. 
 
 
During the period 1992-1998, we can see that the CV increases above the MP, which permits to 
reduce a little the degree of under-assessment. In 1998, the level of under-assessment (CV/MP) 
is the minimum of the period, 29.53%, while the maximum level is achieved right before that 
period. In 1991, it is 20.59%. In any case, we can easily observe that the declared value follows 
38
very closely the path of the CV, while the MP is always well above or below the variations in 
the declared value. This is coherent with the (supposedly) massive use of the CV as price 
indicator in the WT. In any case, note that the variation of the declared values cannot only be 
due to variations in the price of the asset, but also to changes in the decision to acquire a 
dwelling. We will try to control for that fact in the (multivariate) regression analysis, which we 
comment next.  
 
In Table 8, we show the results for housing when we use the CV as the price indicator70. Model 
1 estimates the basic model established in expression [11]. All the estimates have the foreseen 
sign, with the exception of the short run interest rate and the GDP. However, most of the 
estimates are statistically insignificant, which may be due in part to the correlation among the 
variables, which show an important trending component. In Model 2, we try to isolate the 
trending effect by means of including a time trend, which is statistically significant71. However, 
the problem of colinearity among the variables does not seem to be completely solved. That is 
why, we test the possibility of excluding some variables of Model 2 by means of a log-
likelihood ratio test, and obtain a new basic model, Model 3. In Model 3, all the variables have 
the expected sign, once we accept the exclusion of the variable that controlled for the level of 
income, GDP. The elasticity of CV – which recall establishes the maximum level of tax 
compliance - is 0.678. This is the basic result of our empirical analysis that we will later use to 
assess the effectiveness of this tax to levy real estate property. However, before 1988 it was 
slightly lower due to the disincentives to force tax compliance, 0.662 (i.e., 0.678-0.016)72, 
although the most important change in the elasticity occurred in 2000 due to the introduction of 
the exemption of the owner-occupied dwelling, when it decreased up to 0.602 (i.e., 0.678-
0.076). An increase of one percent in the short term interest rate decreases the accumulation of 
real estate property in 0.029%, while ceteris paribus the amount of declared real estate property 
shows a declining trend. The residuals of the original estimation of Model 3 show second-order 
serial correlation, so we estimate a transformed version of that model using nonlinear regression 
techniques, where AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second-order serial correlation coefficients, 
respectively. 
 
Next, we have tried alternative specifications to Model 3, but none of them is preferred to 
                                                 
70 We have restricted our period of analysis to 1983-2001, since the inclusion of 2002 distorted very much 
our results; while in the equation where we use the MP recall we are restricted to the period 1987-2001, 
since that variable is only available since 1987. 
 
71 We also tried the inclusion of a squared time trend, but it was not statistically significant. 
72 We also introduced a dummy to control for a level effect due to the change of the tax unit. However, 
the estimate of the dummy was not statistically significant, and so we were not able to accept its inclusion 
in any model. Then, the estimate of the impact of the “tax on tax revenue” is probably also picking up the 
effect of the change of the tax unit.  
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Model 3 once we use a log-likelihood ratio test to compare the significance of nested models 
(i.e., Model 3 vs. the corresponding alternative). In Model 4, we test the possibility that the 
exemption also has a level effect. In Model 5, we have included a lag of the endogenous 
variable. In Model 6, we have tested the possibility that the decision to invest in housing – as 
long as housing can be considered as an investment asset – is affected by the profitability of 
alternative investments, in particular, equity shares (the expected sign is then negative). The 
(lagged) value of the stock price index (IGBM) is also statistically insignificant. Finally, in 
Model 7, we test the possibility that the exemption for family business had an effect on the 
declared value of housing. The hypothesis behind this test is the fact that some taxpayers could 
have reorganized their investment in housing in order to take advantage of the exemption. Then, 
regarding this possibility, we would expect a negative sign. However, even having introduced 
one and two year ahead dummies (not shown in Table 8), once we recognize the possibility of 
transaction costs, that effect is not statistically significant either. 
 
Table 8 
Table 9 
 
In Table 9, we present the results when we use MP as the price indicator for housing. None of 
the alternative hypotheses tested in Table 8 is accepted either, so Model 3 is still the preferred 
one. However, in contrast when we use the CV, in that model we include the GDP as a control 
variable instead of the short term interest rate. The elasticity of the MP is very low, 10%, and 
statistically significant only at 90%, and almost null once we take into account the exemption 
from 2000 onwards, 0.028 (0.1-0.072). As expected, when we include market prices that are 
probably closer to the real prices of top 1% (Model 2b to Model 2d), the elasticity is logically 
even lower. However, given that we aim at working with the results of Table 8, where we have 
an average CV, from now on we will keep using the results of Model 3 in Table 9. In Table 10 
and Table 11, we offer the results obtained for the R-UB. 
 
Table 10 
Table 11 
 
In Table 12, we offer the first exploitation of the results of our empirical analysis. As we already 
know from section 5.1.1., from the estimates of CV and MP, we can infer the parameter δ , 
which accounts for the degree of under-assessment of CV with respect to the MP. For instance, 
from models 3 (Table 8 and Table 9), this value is equal to 0.1475 (i.e., 0.1/0.678). However, 
this value is not immediately interpretable, as we still have to calculate the constant W in the 
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expression δδ MPWCV ×= −1 , which is different for each year (see fn. 64). However, once we 
have an annual point value for that ration, we cannot be sure about the rest of parameters that 
are part of the elasticity of CV or of MP, and so the estimated elasticities do not have a direct 
interpretation. Then, according to expression [7], we can only interpret those elasticities 
( 678.0ˆ =CVβ  and 1.0ˆ =MPβ ), from a combination of the maximum and minimum values of θ  
andα . This is precisely shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Maximum and Minimum Estimated Values of Marginal Net Tax Compliance 
Disaggregated into Gross Tax Compliance and Under-assessment (1987-2001) 
 Refined Lower Bound (R-LB) Refined Upper Bound (R-UB) 
 NTC-M GTC-M UA-m NTC-m GTC-m UA-M NTC-M GTC-M UA-m NTC-m GTC-m UA-M 
1987 9.74% 38.96% 25.01% 2.06% 2.06% 100% 10.75% 42.98% 25.01% 3.03% 3.03% 100% 
1988 8.83% 37.54% 23.52% 1.76% 1.76% 100% 9.78% 41.57% 23.52% 2.62% 2.62% 100% 
1989 7.88% 37.01% 21.30% 1.55% 1.55% 100% 5.79% 41.04% 21.30% 1.55% 2.33% 100% 
1990 7.91% 35.56% 22.26% 1.44% 1.44% 100% 5.79% 39.60% 22.26% 1.44% 2.19% 100% 
1991 7.33% 35.59% 20.59% 1.34% 1.34% 100% 5.33% 39.62% 20.59% 1.34% 2.06% 100% 
1992 7.82% 35.68% 21.92% 1.43% 1.43% 100% 5.72% 39.72% 21.92% 1.43% 2.18% 100% 
1993 8.27% 35.62% 23.22% 1.50% 1.50% 100% 6.08% 39.66% 23.22% 1.50% 2.27% 100% 
1994 8.67% 35.49% 24.43% 1.56% 1.56% 100% 6.40% 39.53% 24.43% 1.56% 2.35% 100% 
1995 8.86% 35.33% 25.06% 1.57% 1.57% 100% 6.54% 39.37% 25.06% 1.57% 2.37% 100% 
1996 9.35% 34.69% 26.96% 1.59% 1.59% 100% 6.94% 38.73% 26.96% 1.59% 2.40% 100% 
1997 9.88% 33.87% 29.18% 1.60% 1.60% 100% 7.35% 37.91% 29.18% 1.60% 2.41% 100% 
1998 9.88% 33.44% 29.53% 1.56% 1.56% 100% 7.34% 37.48% 29.53% 1.56% 2.36% 100% 
1999 9.19% 33.36% 27.54% 1.46% 1.46% 100% 6.78% 37.40% 27.54% 1.46% 2.21% 100% 
2000 8.35% 33.26% 25.11% 1.33% 1.33% 100% 6.11% 37.29% 25.11% 1.33% 2.04% 100% 
2001 7.60% 33.03% 23.02% 1.21% 1.21% 100% 5.51% 37.07% 23.02% 1.21% 1.87% 100% 
Note: NTC-M & NTC-m: maximum and minimum percentage of net tax compliance, respectively; GTC-M & GTC-m: 
maximum and minimum percentage of gross tax compliance, resp.; and UA-M and UA-m: maximum and minimum 
percentage of under-assessment, resp. All those percentages have been calculated using expression [8]. For each year the 
maximum value of net tax compliance has been obtained for VCβθ ˆ= (maximum value of gross tax compliance) and 0=α , 
while for the minimum, MPβθ ˆ= (minimum value of gross tax compliance) and 1=α . 
 
Probably, the most reasonable values are those closer to the maximum level of tax compliance, 
since we expect the degree of utilization of the MP to be very low. That is why, we will focus 
our comments on the maximum values of net tax compliance. For instance, regarding those 
values obtained by means of the R-LB, in 2001, if 0=α , net tax compliance is equal to 7.60%, 
and the most important negative factor is the degree of under-assessment (23.02%) which value 
is obviously coincident with the ratio CV/MP for that year73, while the estimated level of gross 
tax compliance is 33.03%. The level of net tax compliance is extremely low. However, probably 
even more important, since in fact the level of net compliance is affected in part by legal 
decisions (both regarding α  and regarding δ ), is that along time the (maximum) percentage of 
gross tax compliance is decreasing with the exception of years 1991 and 1992. On the contrary, 
the level of net compliance does not linearly decrease along time due to the fact that the 
                                                 
73 When α=0, we obtain then the average degree of under-assessment, while for higher values of α, we 
obtain the effective degree of under-assessment, that is, rectified taking into account that some dwellings 
are assessed according to the MP. This latter definition of under-assessment is the one we obtain in the 
decomposition of net tax compliance. 
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percentage of the degree of under-assessment shows a more irregular evolution that in some 
occasions tends to compensate the negative evolution of gross tax compliance. The values of R-
UB are slightly higher than those obtained under the R-LB, although the main conclusions do 
not change. 
 
Graph 10: Decomposition of Marginal Net Tax Compliance (1987-2001) 
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Note: Those series are constructed using expression [8] in the main text, from the values 
obtained from the R-LB, and supposing that the percentage of fiscal use of the MP is 10%. 
 
 
In Graph 10, we show the evolution of the decomposition of marginal net tax compliance when 
we consider that the average use of the MP in fiscal terms during 1987-2001 is 10%, and from 
the values of the R-LB. Gross tax compliance shows the decreasing trend previously 
commented. This makes that in those years where the problem of under-assessment is (very 
slightly) mitigated, period 1992 to 1998, the level of net tax compliance does not decrease much 
or even increases a little bit. From 1998, both the level of gross tax compliance and the degree 
of under-assessment go in the same direction, that is, towards lowering net tax compliance.  
 
The result regarding the temporal evolution of gross tax compliance is robust, since it does not 
depend on the value ofα . However, its value is very sensitive to the value ofα  (very especially 
for low values ofα ), as we can check from Table 13 and from Graph 11. Thus, if we suppose 
the most reasonable value of α is 0%, the level of gross tax compliance is between 39% and 
33% during the period, while if consider as more reasonable a value of α equal to 10%, the 
level of gross tax compliance is between 21% and 16%. Despite this ambiguity, the values can 
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be regarded as extremely low, which is even more serious once we take into account the 
unambiguously decreasing trend we observe in all cases. 
 
 
Table 13: Decomposition of Net Tax Compliance (1987-2001), 
for Different Levels of Use of the Market Price as Criterion Assessment 
 Use of the market price=10% Use of the market price=5% 
Year 
% Net Tax 
Compliance 
% Gross Tax 
Compliance 
% Under-
assessment 
% Net Tax 
Compliance 
% Gross Tax 
Compliance 
% Under-
assessment 
1987 5.76% 20.92% 27.55% 7.07% 26.85% 26.32% 
1988 5.12% 19.67% 26.03% 6.19% 24.83% 24.93% 
1989 4.55% 19.15% 23.73% 5.51% 24.30% 22.66% 
1990 4.45% 17.99% 24.73% 5.44% 23.00% 23.64% 
1991 4.13% 17.96% 22.99% 5.04% 22.99% 21.93% 
1992 4.41% 18.07% 24.38% 5.38% 23.10% 23.29% 
1993 4.65% 18.07% 25.72% 5.68% 23.07% 24.62% 
1994 4.85% 17.99% 26.97% 5.94% 22.98% 25.85% 
1995 4.94% 17.88% 27.61% 6.05% 22.84% 26.49% 
1996 5.15% 17.41% 29.55% 6.34% 22.30% 28.41% 
1997 5.34% 16.80% 31.80% 6.62% 21.59% 30.65% 
1998 5.30% 16.46% 32.17% 6.58% 21.21% 31.01% 
1999 4.93% 16.36% 30.14% 6.12% 21.12% 28.99% 
2000 4.49% 16.23% 27.66% 5.57% 20.99% 26.53% 
2001 4.08% 16.00% 25.51% 5.07% 20.76% 24.41% 
Average 4.81% 17.80% 27.10% 5.91% 22.80% 25.98% 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.48% 1.36% 2.81% 0.59% 1.64% 2.78% 
Note: Series are constructed using expression [8] in the main text, from the values obtained from the R-LB. 
 
 
Graph 11 : Gross Tax Compliance Depending on 
the Fiscal Use of the Market Price (1987-2001) 
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Note: see Table 13. 
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Our empirical analysis has also permitted to obtain an estimate of the impact of the exemption 
of the owner-occupied dwelling for 2000 and 2001 (Table 14), and of the disincentives to force 
tax compliance before 1987 (Table 15). The parameterization of the former effect is not easy. 
From expression [10’] (or expression [10’’]), we know that first we need to calculate V, which 
we do in a similar way to the case where the exemption is absent (see fn. 64). Once we have this 
value, and working again with expression [10’] (or expression [10’’]), the impact of the 
exemption depends on the value of α (see note of Graph 9). That is why, in Table 14, we show 
a maximum ( %50=α ) and minimum ( %10=α ) impact of the exemption depending on the 
fiscal use of the MP. Lower or higher (average) values of α  for the years 2000 onwards are 
probably not reasonable. In any case, the differences in the estimated impact of the exemption 
depending on α  are not too great. In all cases, the average impact of the exemption for top 1% 
is well above the maximum value of the exemption (see fn. 66), which is consistent with having 
supposed that 0'== ββ . They all are about 35% of that value. In parenthesis, we show the 
effective subsidy rate for owner-occupied dwellings (i.e., the value of the exemption divided by 
the gross estimated value of housing). 
 
Table 14: Estimated Impact of the Owner-Occupied Dwelling Exemption (2000-01) 
 Refined-Lower Bound (R-LB) Refined-Upper Bound (R-UB) 
 
Minimum 
(α=10%) 
Maximum 
(α=50%) 
Minimum 
(α=10%) 
Maximum 
(α=50%) 
2000 
54,729€ 
(23.40%) 
60,804€ 
(25.34%) 
51,078€ 
(22.19%) 
58,535€ 
(24.63%) 
2001 
56,248€ 
(23.56%) 
62,901€ 
(25.63%) 
52,494€ 
(22.34%) 
60,552€ 
(24.91%) 
Note: 2002 euros 
 
 
The effects of the disincentives to force tax compliance before 1987 are much more modest. We 
have not been able to test those effects from the equation using the MP, since this variable is 
only available from 1987. In this sense, their estimation is easier and can be directly calculated 
from Model 3 in Table 8 (R-LB) and in Table 10 (R-UB). In both cases, the impact is 
simply 3βˆCV , where 3βˆ is the estimated negative difference in the value of the elasticity between 
pre-1987 and the rest of the period (see expression [11]). In parenthesis, we show the percentage 
reduction in tax revenue collected. 
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Table 15: Housing: Estimated Impact of the “Tax on Tax Revenue” (1983-1986) 
 Refined-Lower Bound (R-LB) Refined-Upper Bound (R-UB) 
1983 
8,659 
(4.29%) 
4,300 
(2.17%) 
1984 
8,452 
(4.29%) 
4,219 
(2.17%) 
   
1985 
8,578 
(4.40%) 
4,256 
(2.22%) 
1986 
9,523 
(4.47%) 
4,741 
(2.26%) 
Note: 2002 euros 
 
 
Graph 12: Simulated Effect on Net Tax Compliance of a full update of cadastral values: 
How Much Does the Profitability of Tax Auditing Change? 
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Note: the dotted line is the original one, where gross tax compliance (GTC) and net tax 
compliance (NTC) are calculated using expression [8]. If 1=δ , NTC=GTC, and the 
procedure to obtain it is explained in the note of Graph 13. 
 
 
 
Finally, in Graph 12 and Graph 13, we show the results of different tax policies with respect to 
their effect on the level of net tax compliance, from the results of the R-LB and for year 2001. 
In Graph 12, we simulate the effect on net tax compliance of a full update of cadastral values, 
that is, setting 1=δ  keeping constant the rest of the parameters (compatible with the estimated 
elasticities, βˆ ). Obviously, for 1=δ , there is no difference between gross and net tax 
compliance. If we consider that a reasonable value of gross tax compliance is 16% (i.e., the 
percentage of fiscal use of the MP is about 10%), that change in the degree of under-assessment 
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would dramatically increase the profitability of conducting a tax auditing regarding real estate 
property, from 21% till 100% (i.e., in what percentage increases NTC in front of a 100% 
increase in GTC).   
 
Graph 13: Simulated Effect on Net Tax Compliance of Alternative Policies: Full Update of 
Cadastral values vs. Full Tax Compliance 
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Note: The thicker line is the original one. If 1=δ (dotted line), net tax compliance (NTC) 
is calculated as
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using expression [8], we get the new value of NTC keeping the rest of parameters constant. 
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In Graph 13, we simulate again a full update of cadastral values. Obviously, the advantage of 
that policy cancels out the more the use of the MP. However, given a level of gross tax 
compliance, for low levels ofα , that reform more than doubles the level of net tax compliance. 
In contrast, if we do not update cadastral values but follow a policy of guaranteeing 100% gross 
tax compliance – as long as it were possible – we see that the level of net tax compliance is 
increasing in the use of the MP and for 1=α we achieve a level of net tax compliance of 100%. 
 
On the whole, from the analysis of real estate property declared in the WT, we can conclude that 
the performance of the tax is very poor in the sense that it does not achieve taxing real tax 
capacity (i.e., the level of net tax compliance is very low). This is due both to a very low level of 
(gross) tax compliance, but also to the fact that the real estates are very poorly assessed. This 
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second factor – which throughout the paper has been named as “level of under-assessment” – 
was already very well known. However, the novelty of our analysis is that we have also 
identified a very low level of (gross) tax compliance. Both factors make that the tax levies less 
than 10% of real tax capacity per dwelling, given the value of the constant K. Moreover, 
although the evolution of the degree of under-assessment is variable, we have found that the 
level of (gross) tax compliance is linearly decreasing. Thus, we expect that in the near future the 
performance of this tax will be even worse. Finally, we have simulated those tax policies that 
should be carried out in order to increase the level of net tax compliance. Comparing the policy 
of fully updating the CV and that of guaranteeing full tax compliance, the latter seems much 
more profitable (Graph 13). However, it is obvious that that profitability of this policy is even 
higher as long as the level of under-assessment is low (i.e., the ratio CV/MP is high) (Graph 12).  
 
5.3.2. Equity Shares 
 
In Graph 14, we see that the volatility of declared values of equity shares traded in organized 
markets is much greater than that observed in Graph 9 as far as housing is concerned. In the 
graph, we only show the evolution of equity shares traded in organized markets, since in this 
case we can obtain a much more accurate index for the price of the asset. From 1995 onwards, 
the declared value follows quite closely the evolution of the (market) price index, while during 
the previous period, there are moments in which the variation in the declared value is well 
above that of the price index, and vice versa. During the beginning of the period (1984-87), the 
fact that the declared value evolves above the growth of the price index might be due to the 
expansion of the stock market, that is, to the increasing holding of equity shares as an 
investment asset.  
 
In Table 16 and Table 17, we have performed a multivariable regression analysis. As we said in 
the previous paragraph, we have considered two alternative definitions of the endogenous 
variable, first, a generic one (“Total Equity Shares”), and second, a more particular one (“Equity 
Shares Traded in Organized Markets”). The latter group of equity shares is less important in 
quantitative terms than the rest (1/3 vs. 2/3). However, for that group, we have available a price 
indicator that might not be perfect, but is much better than any indicator we could try to use for 
the rest of equity shares. Then, first, in Table 16, we show the results for “Equity Shares Traded 
in Organized Markets” according to the basic model established in equation [13]. Again, we 
cannot reject the inclusion of a time trend (i.e., Model 2 is preferred to Model 1), while in 
contrast with the case of housing, we cannot reject the inclusion of the lagged endogenous 
variable (i.e., Model 3 is preferred to Model 2). Thus, this suggests certain persistence in the 
portfolio of the equity investors (probably, expecting for long run profitability), if we discard 
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the possibility of (important) transaction costs for recomposing the portfolio. We will come 
back to this issue later. In all models, though, the disincentive effect due to the “tax on tax 
revenue” is not statistically significant.  
 
Graph 14: Evolution of Declared Values of Equity Shares Traded in Organized Markets 
(1984-2002): IGBM 
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In Model 4, we test the possibility that the legal exemptions both in the WT (from 1994) and in 
the IGT (from 1997) have an effect on the declared values. Given that the conditions to benefit 
from those exemptions might need some time for reorganizing the firm, we have tried 
introducing a dummy for the same year and two ahead, but none possibility has been 
statistically accepted. This makes sense, since most of those firms which shares are traded in 
organized markets are not under the control of a single family (recall that both exemptions apply 
to family businesses), but their control is usually shared among many shareholders. Thus, 
finally, the preferred model is Model 5 once we have tested the rejection of certain control 
variables and also of the legal exemption, which is accepted by means of a ratio likelihood test. 
The elasticity of the IGBM is 0.759, that is, an increase of 1% in IGBM provokes an increase of 
0.0759% in the declared value. As usual, in Table 17, we have performed the same analysis, but 
for the Refined-Upper Bound. 
 
Table 16 
Table 17 
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Given the result about the persistency in the investment portfolio, that is, given the statistical 
significance of the endogenous lagged variable, in Model 6 we have tested whether that is due 
to a long term financial position of investors. In particular, we have tested whether that is 
picking up the fact that investors decide the composition of their portfolio taking into account 
the past performance of the stock market. We account for past performance by means of a 
moving (or weighted moving) average over last three years. Once we include this MA (or 
WMA) variable, the lagged value loses all its statistical significance. Model 7 and Model 8 
show the results of taking into account past performance of the stock market. In any case, we 
will take Model 5a to perform the next simulations. 
 
In Table 18 and Table 19, we have carried out the same empirical exercise, but for “Total 
Equity Shares”. Given that the total amount of shares includes those shares non traded in 
organized markets, and so there being included the shares of some family business, we would 
expect that the effect of the legal exemption were now significant and with a negative sign. We 
would also expect a lower coefficient of the price index, since it is a poor indicator for the 
whole set of equity shares taxed in the WT. All these hypotheses hold. The preferred model is 
Model 3, where the estimated elasticity is 0.194 The impact of each exemption is only 
significant regarding the WT, while the negative impact of the “tax on tax revenue” effect is 
now statistically significant.  
 
Table 18 
Table 19 
 
Table 20: Equity Shares: Estimated Impact of the “Tax on Tax Revenue” (1983-86) 
 Refined-Lower Bound Refined-Upper Bound 
1983 
28,500 
(16.82%) 
30,192 
(17.59%) 
1984 
29,229 
(16.94%) 
31,130 
(17.71%) 
1985 
31,406 
(16.40%) 
33,246 
(17.14%) 
1986 
37,746 
(17.43%) 
40,115 
(18.22%) 
Note: 2002 euros  
 
 
Precisely, in Table 20, we present the quantification of the “tax on tax revenue effect”. In 
comparison with the impact detected for housing, this is greater, both in percentage and absolute 
values. Hence, it seems that the disincentives to properly administer this tax carried a much 
more inefficient administration and control of equity shares than of real estate property. In Table 
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21, we show the estimated impact of the business exemption. If we compare it with the housing 
exemption from 2000 onwards (Table 14), the impact of the business exemption is relatively 
less important, about half the importance of the housing exemption. 
 
Table 21: Estimated Impact of Family Business Exemption at WT (1994 onwards) 
 Refined Lower Bound Refined Upper Bound 
1994 
44,157 
(23.43%) 
44,653 
(23.28%) 
1995 
45,078 
(23.43%) 
45,459 
(23.28%) 
1996 
52,282 
(23.43%) 
52,455 
(23.28%) 
1997 
44,632 
(23.43%) 
44,481 
(23.28%) 
1998 
49,010 
(23.43%) 
48,666 
(23.28%) 
1999 
54,840 
(23.43%) 
54,579 
(23.28%) 
2000 
60,253 
(23.43%) 
59,741 
(23.28%) 
2001 
56,522 
(23.43%) 
56,043 
(23.28%) 
2002 
46,371 
(23.43%) 
46,083 
(23.28%) 
Average 50,349 50,240 
Note: 2002 euros  
 
 
Finally, in Graph 15, we show the evolution of the level of tax compliance during the analyzed 
period for those equity shares traded in organized markets, that is, for those shares which price 
index is relatively more accurately measured. All series have been constructed from the results 
of Model 5 in Table 16. In order to transform the elasticity of the stock market index we have 
employed different prices, all around the average value of 5.5 euros per share we calculated in 
section 5.1.2. In contrast with the case of housing (see, e.g., net tax compliance in Graph 10, 
there is not a clear linear trend in the temporal evolution of the level of tax compliance, although 
on average there also seems to be a decreasing trend. Independently of the price used to 
transform the elasticity of the index, the temporal evolution of tax compliance is the same, 
although the differences in absolute values are relatively significant. For instance, for a price 
equal to 6 euros per equity share, the maximum level of marginal tax compliance was in 1992 
(66.33%) and the minimum in 1999 (48.80%), since then on there is an increasing trend. On the 
whole, in contrast with the case of housing, there is not a clear linear trend, and the levels of 
marginal net tax compliance are higher. 
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Graph 15: Estimated Evolution of Marginal Tax Compliance: Equity Shares Traded in 
Organized Markets (R-LB) 
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5.4. An attempt to estimate Absolute Net Tax Compliance 
 
The previous analysis has permitted us to check to what extent the Spanish WT achieves taxing 
real capacity, and how that performance has evolved along time. We have checked the poor 
performance of the tax both due to tax incompliance (housing and equity shares) and under-
assessment (housing). In this section, we will attempt to quantify in monetary terms the 
consequence of that performance, that is, what is on average the money not declared by 
taxpayer, either due to (gross) tax incompliance or to a wrong assessment of the assets under 
taxation. 
 
5.4.1. Housing  
 
In the case of housing, the estimated declared value is obtained from the following equation: 
 
( ) ( ) 21 θθ RtRtKDtDt qpeqp ××=  [14] 
 
In section 5.3.1, when we carried out the exploitation of the empirical results, we only focused 
our analysis on what we called marginal tax compliance, and we did that from the estimates of 
the elasticity of the price used to assess each dwelling. As we argued in section 5.1.1, we were 
not able to include but proxies of the propensity to accumulate this asset, that is, some variables 
that attempted to control for Rtq . Given the impreciseness of the estimates obtained from those 
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controls, it made sense to focus only on the estimates of the elasticity of Rtp . However, we 
would expect that the estimation of gross tax compliance referring to Rtp were equally 
applicable to Rtq , once we take into account that the elasticity of 
R
tp  is (potentially) different 
from the elasticity of Rtq due to the assessment criterion. 
 
Then, in contrast with the definition of marginal tax compliance, we define absolute tax 
compliance as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
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That is, absolute tax compliance does not only include the impact on the number of dwellings 
declared, but it also takes into account the constant, K. Unfortunately, as we have just said 
above, we do not have a precise estimation of the elasticity of Rtq , although in the empirical 
analysis we obviously controlled for the propensity to accumulate this asset by means of GDP, a 
short run interest rate and a time trend. Then, we use the impact of gross tax compliance 
obtained from the elasticity of Rtp to estimate that related to
R
tq . Taking this fact into account 
and also the fact that the estimated elasticity of Rtp also includes the impact of a potentially 
wrong assessment of the MP, 
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   [16] 
 
Therefore, in order to estimate the absolute level of net tax compliance, we have to employ the 
(squared) level of gross tax compliance and the level of under-assessment obtained from the 
estimates of the price index, and also the constant term. In Table 13, we provided values of 
under-assessment and gross tax compliance depending on the fiscal use of the MP. Then, in 
Graph 16, we show the evolution of absolute net tax compliance for several levels of use of the 
MP. In spite of the slight improve in net tax compliance since 1991 (in that year, 
underassessment achieves its lowest level, that is, the ratio CV/MP is minimum), absolute net 
tax compliance is decreasing. The temporal evolution is equal to that obtained from marginal 
tax compliance (see Graph 10). 
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Graph 16: Housing: Absolute Net Tax Compliance (1987-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: all series constructed using expression [16], and the corresponding values 
shown in Table 13 (similarly for alfa=20%), while the value of the constant is that 
obtained from the estimation of Model 3 (Table 8). 
 
 
Then, given those levels of absolute net tax compliance, we can calculate the evolution of the 
average monetary amounts of housing that should be declared by top 1% in absence of under-
assessment and tax incompliance. We suppose MP is used in 1 out of 10 assessments. As can be 
checked from Graph 17, the differences between real and declared amounts are very significant; 
while declared absolute values show a very flat evolution, real values are much more volatile 
and on average present an increasing trend.  
 
Graph 17: Housing: Evolution of Declared Values vs. Real Values (1987-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: monetary amounts expressed as 1,000 euros (2002); all series have been corrected for the 
impact of the owner-occupied dwelling (see Table 14); and have been calculated for α=0.075 
(i.e., for a 10% fiscal use of the MP), and from R-LB. The yellow line has been calculated for 
δ=0.15, which corresponds approximately with a 20% of under-assessment (i.e., CV/MP=0.20), 
that is, the real average degree of under-assessment. 
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5.4.2. Equity Shares 
 
The procedure established in the previous section cannot be directly applied to the case of 
equity shares due to the nature of the exogenous variable used as price indicator (IGBM) in 
expression [13]. The variable we used was a stock market index. Thus, in the case of equity 
shares expression [14] is:    
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where Rp0 is a constant, the average price of equity shares in the base year, 1983. Thus, we 
implicitly estimated the following equation: 
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However, we do not know the value of Rp0 , and so cannot disentangle from the estimate of K, 
the value of K’ and that of Rp0 . Then, as usual, in order to calculate the level of tax compliance, 
we calculate it using expression [17],  
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That is, we rectify the original constant term multiplying it by ( ) 10 θ−Rp , while the marginal net 
compliance is multiplied by ( ) 10 1−θRp  as we already explained in section 5.1.2 by means of 
expression [13]. The value of marginal tax compliance obtained in this way is also applied to 
explain the level of marginal compliance related to q.  
 
Then, in Graph 18, we show the evolution of absolute net tax compliance of those equity shares 
traded in organized markets for three (possible) values of the MP of equity shares in 1983. All 
of them are very close to the approximate average we obtained in section 5.1.2, which recall it is 
about 5.5€/share. Again, that evolution is fully compatible with that obtained for marginal tax 
compliance in Graph 15.  
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As can be checked from Graph 19, the discrepancy between real and declared values expressed 
in monetary terms is not as spectacular as that obtained for housing. On the whole, although the 
absolute levels of tax compliance are not very high, they are slightly higher than those obtained 
for housing. In the case of equity shares, it is very clear that the gap between declared and real 
values, that is, tax incompliance, increases in the booming years (1986-1991 & 1997-2000).  
 
Graph 18: Equity Shares traded in Organized Markets:  
Absolute Net Tax Compliance (1983-2001) 
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Graph 19: Equity Shares: Evolution of Declared Values vs. Real Values (1983-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: monetary amounts expressed as 1,000 euros (2002); the real has been calculated 
using the percentage of absolute net tax compliance compatible with a MP of equity 
shares equal to 6 euros; and from R-LB.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Spain is one of the few countries still taxes the possession of wealth, being one of the main 
arguments to justify a WT its redistributive role. However, differences when assessing assets 
and particular concessions characterize the Spanish tax. Thus, housing, the most important 
component of wealth, is under-assessed, and business assets and owner-occupied dwellings are 
exempt, which introduces distortions and inequalities, promoting tax avoidance. These factors, 
along with presumptive high evasion, make difficult to achieve in practice any possible 
redistributive effect. These features are not particular of the Spanish WT, since we find similar 
situations in other countries’ WT, which along the practical difficulties in taxing capital is 
taking an increasing number of countries to repeal WT74.  
 
Our empirical analysis has tried to test whether those potential failures of WT are relevant, 
being the following the main conclusions: 
 
 Regarding the main asset under taxation, real estate property, the level of net tax 
compliance – which includes gross tax compliance and under-assessment – is well below 
50% and shows a decreasing trend. This characteristic has also been detected regarding 
equity shares, although to a lesser extent. Therefore, we conclude that the WT fails in 
reducing vertical inequity, as only a small part of wealth is really taxed, while horizontal 
equity might also be questioned given the differences in the level of tax compliance 
between the two main assets.  
 
 Given this negative assessment of the tax regarding under-assessment and tax incompliance, 
we have simulated two different policies regarding real property: a full update of the CV 
and enforcing tax compliance. Comparing both, the latter one would be much more 
profitable.  
 
In conclusion, WT does not achieve taxing real tax ability, and so does not accomplish 
its main aim of reducing wealth concentration. This would be especially serious if 
wealth inequality were either high or showed an increasing trend. The evolution of 
wealth distribution for top 1% shows concentration has risen in Spain since 1988. 
Therefore, if the objective is to reduce concentration, taxation could be a means to that 
end, but the issue is to find the proper means. Current WT is definitively not. Then the 
question is: should it be eliminated or reformed? From the international experience, the 
first possibility has been the rule. 
                                                 
74 See Bertocchi (2007) for a theoretical model that adopting a historical perspective (both regarding the 
process of wealth accumulation that tends to diminish wealth inequality, and the change in wealth 
composition from hard-to-avoid taxes to easy ones) corroborates the international experience regarding 
the less important role of wealth taxes, in particular, bequest taxes. 
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